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ARTICLES
THE FOLKLORE OF INFORMATIONALISM:
THE CASE OF SEARCH ENGINE SPEECH
Oren Bracha*
Are search engine results protected speech under the First Amendment?
This has become an essential question in the debate over search engine
regulation. Search engine speech is at the cutting edge of several recent
trends in First Amendment jurisprudence: the challenge of protection for
machine-generated speech, a recent tendency toward constraining
governmental economic regulatory power through aggressive and broad
interpretation of freedom of speech, and the question of limitations on the
coverage of the First Amendment. Arguments on behalf of First
Amendment protection for search engine results focus on different protected
speech interests. Free speech scrutiny is justified and necessary when it
defends the speech interests of indexed content providers or users. But
search engine speech proponents have gone further, arguing that search
engines are protected either as editors or speakers themselves. These
arguments are doctrinally uncertain and normatively baseless. Despite
some possible support in recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the theory of
First Amendment coverage on which these arguments rely is not firmly
grounded in doctrine and its potentially far-reaching implications have not
been considered. As a normative matter, the broad arguments for search
engine speech stand on dubious foundations. A proper examination of the
social practices of search engine speech reveals that none of the established
normative theories of freedom of speech provide clear support for including
such expression within the scope of the First Amendment. This normative
conclusion can be accommodated and First Amendment protection to
search engine speech can be denied by developing existing doctrinal tools.
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INTRODUCTION
Last night, Google spoke to me. I asked about the best French
restaurants in my neighborhood, and it expressed its opinions on the
subject. We spent half the night arguing. If you find the preceding lines
strange then you have not been following the debate over search engine
speech. The problem of search engine speech is at the forefront of the
broader debate over machine speech.1 Is the expressive content generated
by computerized machines—the maps that appear on the screen of a GPS
navigational aid, your social network’s recommendations of new friends, or
the list of synonyms proposed by my word processor—speech protected
under the First Amendment? This question is, in turn, a subset of a larger
set of vexing challenges created by the impending technological reality of
We have electronic
pervasive semiautonomous automated agents.2
artificial agents who contract in our name, partially (soon to be fully)
automated drones that kill for us, and computer platforms that speak to us.
Can these semiautonomous agents be contained by the existing categories
1. See Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A29.
2. See generally SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY
AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS (2011).

FOR
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of the relevant laws, or should those categories and laws change in order to
adequately accommodate them? Can we easily trace the lines linking the
actions of these automated machines to the people who created and
programmed them, thereby simply connecting the actions to the array of
legal rights and duties of such human agents? Not since the last time a
radically new social phenomenon in the form of “corporate persons”
challenged existing legal categories was the law faced with such demanding
conceptual and normative tasks.3 This Article tackles in detail one limited
(but complex enough) facet of the challenge of automated agents, that of
search engine speech.
The origins of the search engine speech debate are much more prosaic
than the deep philosophical and conceptual questions alluded to above.
General purpose internet search engines constitute big business.4 The
economic, social, and cultural importance of these vital information
gatekeepers, together with the dominance of one firm (Google), have
provoked demands for scrutiny and legal restrictions on the activities of
search engines.5 Complaints of search engine manipulation, bias, or abuse
and proposals for remedying them take many forms, but all share a common
element: a claim for restricting in some way the search engine’s absolute
discretion over ranking and presenting search results to users.6 The First
Amendment has emerged as a doomsday defensive weapon in this struggle.
It proved to be such an effective weapon because it is one of the most
formidable barriers for government regulation in contemporary
constitutional law.7 From the perspective of those seeking to avoid
regulation, if only search engine results could be plausibly presented as
protectable speech, absolute discretion over them would be considerably
shielded from any legal constraint. And this is exactly what has happened
in the last decade. Arguments that search engine results are speech
protected under the First Amendment were first tested, with great success,
in the early court cases involving attempts to limit Google’s complete
discretion over its search practices through a variety of common law and
statutory doctrines.8 Since then, the argument has been perfected and it has

3. For a description of how corporate personhood challenged existing legal categories,
see generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65–107 (1992), and Gregory A. Mark, The
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441
(1987).
4. See, e.g., JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE
THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 123 (2005) (describing how
Google’s value rose from nothing to $3 billion in five years); Jennifer Slegg, Search
Revenues Hit $8.7 Billion in First Half of 2013, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Oct. 15 2013),
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2300829/Search-Revenues-Hit-8.7-Billion-in-FirstHalf-of-2013.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 43–56.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 47–52.
7. See infra text accompanying note 166.
8. See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007);
Kinderstart.com v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *13 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Datner v. Yahoo, No. BC 355217, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12,
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emerged as Google’s first line of defense on all of the fronts in which the
search engine regulation battle is joined.9
This Article brackets the policy question of whether search engine
regulations are desirable or feasible. It focuses instead on what started as a
sideshow but is gradually turning into the main event: the question of
search engine speech. The general proposition that search engines’ ranking
of their results is protected under the First Amendment represents several,
very different, arguments whose applications lead to different results. The
most plausible variant of the argument is that the First Amendment protects
against the government’s use of search engines as censorial tools.10 Search
engines are vital intermediaries for internet information.11 As such,
governments could use them to restrict both expression of, and access to,
disfavored viewpoints.12 From this perspective, the protected speech
interest is that of speakers and users rather than that of the search engine
itself. The First Amendment has a vital role to play in protecting the speech
rights of users against censorial regulations seeking to utilize the control
power of search engines.
The focus on the speech interest of users, however, leaves much room for
regulations of search ranking not aimed at suppressing users’ speech. This
is why most proponents of search engine speech have turned to different
theories. These alternative theories present the search engine itself as the
bearer of the protected speech rights. In one version of the argument,
search engines are portrayed as editors of content, the equivalent of
newspapers, who enjoy the shield extended by the First Amendment to the
editorial discretion of such actors.13 In an even more ambitious variant,
search engines are seen as the speakers whose protected speech consists of
opinions on the relative relevance of websites displayed in search results.14
These theories, already adopted by several courts adjudicating cases of
alleged manipulation of search engine results,15 provide a much stronger
constitutional protection to the search engine’s control over its results. But
are they sound?
At first blush, it appears that straightforward application of First
Amendment doctrine validates both the editor and direct-speaker theory of
search engine speech. But there are strong doctrinal arguments to the
contrary. At a minimum, a careful application of existing doctrine produces
inconclusive results.
There is more at stake here, however, than hasty application of doctrine
to the specific case of search engine ranking. If accepted, the broad
2006); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27193, at *12 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 51–53.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 62–79.
11. See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1,
3 (2007).
12. See James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 901 (2014).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 80–90.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 110–17.
15. See cases cited supra note 8.
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arguments for search engine speech rights and, especially, the version
recasting search results as opinions protected under the First Amendment,
involve potential implications that go well beyond the context of internet
search. The search-engines-as-speakers argument relies on an extremely
broad theory of First Amendment coverage. According to this theory any
communication that satisfies a capacious technical definition of speech
merits First Amendment protection—subject only to a narrow list of
categories of excluded speech.16 If taken seriously, this weak threshold
principle opens the floodgates to an enormous stream of First Amendment
claims. This is doubly true in the age of information and machine speech
when a multitude of economic and social activities may fit the formal
definition of speech. Such a result could hamper governmental ability to
regulate in vast areas.17 Under the basic structure of post–New Deal
constitutional law, only a relatively small subset of regulation is subject to a
high level of constitutional scrutiny of the kind required by the First
Amendment.18 The search-engine-as-speakers argument, however, has the
potential to upend that structure.19
One may respond that subjecting a large share of government’s
regulatory power to an exacting standard of constitutional scrutiny is,
though perhaps unfortunate, nonetheless an unavoidable outcome of the
meeting between existing First Amendment doctrine and new technological
realities. This response misses the fact that the coverage of the First
Amendment has never been as broad as assumed by the search engine
speech argument.20 The difficulty with coverage limitations is the obscure
nature of doctrine in this area and, especially, the absence of anything
resembling a clear criterion. Courts have traditionally relied on tacit
consensus and classificatory maneuvers to limit the coverage of the First
Amendment without developing clear guidance on how to draw the line.21
The strong claims for search engine speech rights upset any tacit consensus
in this area and force the question of coverage to the open.
Following Robert Post, I argue that the best way to answer the question
of First Amendment coverage is through a normative analysis of the
specific social practices in which a particular speech is embedded.22
Understood within its specific social context—namely, the relevant social
practices of speakers and listeners—search engine speech is hard to justify
on the basis of any of the traditional theories of freedom of speech.23 To

16. See Stuart Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1458–61 (2013).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 155–63.
18. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 164–69.
20. See Fredrick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) (“[T]he
speech with which the First Amendment deals is the exception and the speech that may
routinely be regulated is the rule.”).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 152–54.
22. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249
(1995).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 183–96.
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date, nobody has offered a plausible account of how the social practices of
search engine speech are relevant to any set of values possibly underlying
the First Amendment.
Courts are unlikely, however, to apply direct normative analysis on a
case-by-case basis. They may need more concrete guidelines for deciding
coverage questions in cases involving machine speech and speech in a
functional context more generally. As recently suggested by Professor Tim
Wu, such guidance could be found in a functionality doctrine.24 Under this
doctrine, functional speech is not protected by the First Amendment. The
rudimentary basis of such a doctrine already exists in the case law.25 To
meet the challenges of machine speech, however, the doctrine must be
further developed and clarified. A well-defined functionality doctrine must
require an examination of the social practices associated with speech
allegedly restricted by a specific regulation. Under such a rule, the First
Amendment will not cover any speech practice that is primarily
preoccupied with functional activities or purposes and that is not more than
trivially connected to the realization of any free speech values (for example,
commanding a machine to execute computer code). This means that such a
speech practice will trigger no First Amendment scrutiny, even if speech in
the technical sense (i.e., the communication of a message potentially
understandable by a recipient) is restricted and even if such restriction is
based on the content of the speech.26
When examined under the functionality doctrine elaborated here, search
engine rankings are clearly functional. Their purpose is, overwhelmingly,
to help or channel users trying to find specific content; there is no real
dialogue between user and search engine.27 Search engine speech, while
communicative, is much like an interactive and complex series of
conventional road signs whose content is limited to that necessary for the
function of guiding travelers in particular directions. Speech of this type is
exactly the kind to which First Amendment protection would be denied
altogether under a well-defined functionality doctrine.
Courts must not blindly extend First Amendment protection to search
engine speech while refusing to examine either the social practices within
which this speech is embedded or the relevance of underlying values. Such
blind insistence on First Amendment protection is the information age
analog to what Thurman Arnold long ago called “the folklore of
capitalism”: the uncritical transfer of concepts and beliefs taken from one
socioeconomic context to a thoroughly different one.28 Arnold attacked the
“folklorist” assumption that an economy dominated by business
corporations constituting tremendous concentration of power and wealth
was the same as Adam Smith’s free market composed of individual actors,
an assumption embodied in the legitimacy-conferring myth of the corporate
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1495, 1496–97 (2013).
See infra text accompanying notes 226–49.
See infra text accompanying notes 250–51.
See infra text accompanying notes 259–63.
THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937).
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person.29 The claim on behalf of search engine speech is part of a folklore
of informationalism. It is based on the uncritical assumption that simply
because communication generated by machines as part of functional
processes meets a technical, broad definition of speech, it is the same as
other social practices involving speech and thus it normatively merits the
same constitutional protection. The result is the legitimacy-conferring myth
of the speaking search engine.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, another
commonality of the folklore of capitalism and the folklore of
informationalism is that both were wielded as a shield against government
regulation of big business. To avoid the pitfalls of the folklore of
informationalism, the phenomenon of search engine speech must be
understood in its social context and then normatively evaluated.
Part I of this Article briefly explains the origins of the search engine
speech debate and describes the types of regulations relevant for First
Amendment claims in this area. It discusses each of the three concrete free
speech arguments hidden in the general claim for First Amendment
protection for search results: protection of the speech interests of users and
content providers instrumentally affected by the operation of search
engines, protection of the speech interest of search engines as editors of
content provided by others, and protection of the speech interest of search
engines as direct speakers. Part II focuses on the third, most ambitious
variant of the argument, which treats the search engine as a direct speaker.
Under this argument, search results are speech that embodies opinions of
relevance protected under the First Amendment. Part II also discusses the
inconclusive result of existing legal doctrine as applied to this claim,
develops a normative framework for analyzing First Amendment coverage
questions, and applies this framework to our case. Part II concludes that no
plausible normative justification exists for extending First Amendment
protection to the speech embodied in search results. Part III asks how
courts can apply this conclusion. It discusses the possible development of
an explicit functionality doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence and
explains how this doctrine should be applied to search results.
I. SEARCH ENGINE SPEECH
Evaluating the claims that search engine results constitute speech
protected under the First Amendment requires a clear understanding of two
elements often left ambiguous by such claims. First, we need a precise
understanding of the regulation at issue—of what exactly is potentially
regulated and how. Second, we need an accurate definition of the speech
interest allegedly negatively affected by the regulation. After a brief
introduction to the way search engines work, this Part takes up each of
these two questions.

29. See id. at 185–206.
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A. Search Engine Fundamentals
Search engines are a crucial part of the internet’s infrastructure. Their
basic function is to help users locate and access information relevant for the
users’ preferences or needs.30 The exact details of search engines’ services
change dynamically, but their basic method of operation has remained
largely stable. Search engines direct users to information through a threestep process.
First, search engines scour or “crawl” particular sources of information to
ascertain the information in those sources, including metainformation about
the relations between the sources.31 The core sources of information
covered by search engines are webpages. In principle, however, search
engines can cover any source of information that exists in a form amenable
to digital searches. The information sources covered by search engines
have been expanding in recent years with the proliferation of sourcespecific search services such as Google’s books or patents search.32
Second, search engines index the information sources they cover. In this
stage, the information gathered from the sources is analyzed using a
complex algorithm.33 The algorithm is the “secret sauce” of the search
engine. It is the most important element that gives search its value and
differentiates one service from another.34 The algorithm analyzes the
information sources and their relationships according to a complex array of
parameters.35 The result of this process is a search index that contains
information about the relevance and importance of covered sources in
regard to particular search terms.36
Third, search engines allow users to run specific searches. This is
typically done through a textual search query submitted by the user,
containing one or more search terms. The search engine analyzes the
search query by reference to its index and produces a list of results.37 The
search engine typically presents these results as a list of text items ranked in
descending order of relevance. In general web searches, each result item is
hyperlinked to the actual webpage listed. Historically, search engine results
were uniform in the sense that an identical search query would produce the
same results, independent of the user’s identity or other contextual
information about the search.38 The trend today is toward growing
30. Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 6 (“[A] search engine is a service that helps its
users locate content on the Internet.”).
31. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 877.
32. Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 6 (“[S]earch engines help users find more than just
web pages.”).
33. Id. at 9.
34. See DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 45–57 (2005); Frederic
Filloux, Google News:
The Secret Sauce, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/feb/25/1.
35. Steven Levy, Inside The Box, WIRED, Mar. 2010, at 96, available at
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/02/ff_google_algorithm/.
36. Id.
37. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 877.
38. Zhongming Ma et al., Interest-Based Personalized Search, 25 ACM TRANS. ON
INFO. SYS., Feb. 2007, at 1, 2, available at http://www.csupomona.edu/~zma/research/
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personalization of search results.39 Personalized search results are tailored
to the specific interests and characteristics of the user. This means that an
identical search query may produce different results depending on various
contextual factors. Personalizing search results is based on profiling or
modeling the user on the basis of various kinds of information, such as
personal information directly supplied by users and analysis of past search
and web usage patterns.40
Search engines are, thus, important information intermediaries.41 Their
main value resides in their effective ability to connect between two groups:
users who want to access information and information providers.42 Both
the demand for search engine regulation and the exact meaning of opposing
free speech arguments are based on search engines’ status as information
intermediaries. By locating relevant information, search engines perform
an invaluable function that greatly enhances the value of the internet for
both users and information providers.
The status of search engines as information intermediaries, however, also
creates the risk of abuse. Controlling the bottlenecks of internet
information flows bestows incredible power on search engines. This power
creates, in turn, the risk of abuse,43 especially given the natural tendency
toward concentration of the search market and the inherent limitations of
effective market discipline in this field.44 The result has been a litany of
complaints by critics against alleged abusive search engine practices

Interest-Based%20Personalized%20Search.pdf (describing one-size-fits-all searches in
which an “identical query from different users or in different contexts will generate the same
set of results displayed in the same way for all users”).
39. See id.; James Pitkow et al., Personalized Search, 45 COMM. ACM, Sept. 2002, at
50, 50, available at http://www.cond.org/p50-pitkow.pdf (describing a shift in search from
“consensus relevancy” toward “personal relevancy”).
40. See Pitkow, supra note 39, at 51 (discussing techniques for personalizing search and
dividing them into two groups: “contextualization and individualization” (emphasis added)).
41. NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE:
THE EFFECTS OF CYBERSPACE ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (2004) (“Search
engines are becoming the new virtual gatekeepers of Cyberspace.”).
42. See Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 7 (observing that a search engine can match
users with appropriate content providers, to the benefit of both).
43. See James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, in THE NEXT
DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435, 436 (Berin Szoka & Adam
Marcus eds., 2010) (observing that search engine critics aim to keep search engines “from
abusing their dominant position,” but “[t]he hard part comes in defining ‘abuse’”); see also
Nicholas P. Dickerson, What Makes the Internet So Special? And Why, Where, How, and by
Whom Should Its Content Be Regulated?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 61, 90 (2009) (“The policies of
Google . . . represent a glaring example of corporate abuse of regulatory power.”); Frank
Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in
Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 108 (2010) (“A troubling asymmetry has
developed: as dominant intermediaries gather more information about users, users have less
sense of exactly how life online is being ordered by the carriers and search engines they rely
on.”).
44. On the limitation of market forces in disciplining search engine behavior, see Oren
Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?
Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1179–86 (2008);
Grimmelmann, supra note 43, at 440.
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prejudicial to the interest of either users or information providers.45 These
complaints have led to demands for search engine regulation,46 and, in turn,
to the First Amendment counterargument. The exact nature of this free
speech argument depends on competing understandings of the relevant
speech and the relevant protected speech interest. The speech and the
protected speech interest may be attributed to each of the actors in the
tripartite relationship created by search engines: users, information
providers, and the intermediary—the search engine itself. In what follows,
I explain the exact nature of the use of the First Amendment as a shield
against regulation of search results and the various versions of the argument
as a function of the alternative understandings of the speech and speech
interest involved.
B. What Regulation?
Whether and how the First Amendment applies to a particular regulation
depends on the characteristics of the regulation. Proponents of search
engine speech have cast their net widely, challenging the constitutionality
of a broad array of regulations. Arguments for First Amendment protection
for search results first appeared in cases where disgruntled website
operators, adversely affected by allegedly illegitimate manipulation of
search results, tried to impose legal liability on Google.47 These plaintiffs
relied on an assortment of business torts and civil causes of action. In
response, Google argued that imposing liability under any of these causes
of action on the basis of the search engine algorithm’s rankings would
abridge the search engine’s speech rights, and several courts agreed.48
These rulings imply that the First Amendment prohibits imposing liability
based on search ranking, irrespective of the exact details of the relevant
private law causes of action and their application in specific cases. More
recently, prodded by complaints from Google’s competitors about unfair
practices in regard to its search results, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) launched an investigation of Google’s search practices.49 The FTC

45. See, e.g., Viva R. Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 475, 487–90
(2009) (discussing claims of negative effects of search engine power leading to calls for
regulation); Pasquale, supra note 43, at 110–24 (discussing the various dangers of new
“unaccountable intermediaries” including search engines).
46. Moffat, supra note 45, at 489 (“Concerns over [the detrimental effects of search
engine power] have prompted the call for centralized regulation.”).
47. See supra note 8.
48. See Kinderstart.com v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at
*21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (confronting Google’s argument for immunity under the First
Amendment in response to a wide range of causes of actions asserted against its search
ranking practices); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *10–13 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (rejecting a claim for tortious
interference with contractual relations because Google’s ranking of a website in its results
constituted opinions protected under the First Amendment and therefore could not be
considered wrongful).
49. See In re Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (Concurring and Dissenting Statement
of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding Google’s Search Practices Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/concurring-and-
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terminated the investigation with no significant results.50 One major
defense line deployed by Google’s defenders, however, was that any
interference with the search engine’s discretion over its search results would
violate the First Amendment.51 Finally, in light of this trend, various
reform proposals suggesting statutory or administrative mechanisms for
regulating or at least monitoring search ranking practices have had to
contend with First Amendment objections.52
As a result of these developments, the First Amendment has emerged as a
doomsday defensive weapon deployed to counter any attempt to “regulate”
search results prior to examining the regulations’ merits or applying
relevant doctrines. Bolstered by its early success, the generic speech
argument can now be applied to virtually any format of “regulation” of
search results and is beginning to spread to analogous realms.53 The key
feature common to all the various regulatory measures now under the
shadow of the First Amendment is restrictions on the search engine’s
absolute power to identify and rank search results. Whether the restriction
is the result of tort liability backed by civil remedies, administrative action
backed by administrative enforcement powers, or a proposed specific
regulatory regime, the logic of the argument is the same: any coercive
interference with search results abridges speech and is thus prohibited by
the First Amendment.
This Article is not concerned with the policy desirability of any specific
measure aimed at constraining search engines’ absolute discretion over their
search results or with the optimal way for implementing such measures. A
particular statutory scheme or the application of various common law
causes of action to the practices of search ranking may be an undesirable or
unworkable policy. Even if this is the case, however, whether the First
Amendment generates a constitutional prohibition that blocks the
implementation of any such measure—as many seem to think—remains a
distinct and open question. The analysis here focuses on this threshold
question, which has crucial implications for the ability of government to
regulate in the information age well beyond the realm of search engine
ranking practices.

dissenting-statement-commissioner-j.thomas-rosch-regarding-googles-searchpractices/130103googlesearchstmt.pdf.
50. See id. at 1.
51. See EUGENE VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR
SEARCH ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS (2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf.
52. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1188–1201; Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right
to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1095, 1124–29 (2007).
53. See Rosenberg v. Harwood, No. 100916536, 2011 WL 3153314 (D. Utah May 27,
2011). Google had argued that a negligence claim based on Google Maps’ faulty directions
is barred by the First Amendment and by the Utah Constitution’s protection for freedom of
speech. The court avoided the constitutional question and decided the case on principles of
tort law. Id.
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C. What Speech?
The First Amendment argument rejects, then, any restriction of the
search engine’s absolute discretion over its results as a prohibited
abridgment of speech. What, however, is the relevant speech being
abridged? As explained in detail below, proponents of search engine
speech have relied on different answers to this question and occasionally
offered only opaque or ambiguous responses to it. There are three possible
speech interests related to search engine results. Taking each of these
speech interests as the focus of the First Amendment produces three very
different versions of the free speech argument. Each of those arguments
leads, in turn, to very different conclusions about the permissibility of
search engine regulation.
1. Search Engine Constituencies’ Speech
The first speech interest implicated by search results is both the most
plausible and the most important. Yet, for reasons to be explained
momentarily, this speech interest is ignored by most, especially by those
who would use the First Amendment as an absolute shield for search
engines’ control over their result ranking. This is the speech interest of
content providers, who depend on search engines for having their voice
heard, and end users, who rely on the search engine to find and access
information.
It is a commonplace observation that the internet and digital technology
have opened up and democratized opportunities for speech. Famously, the
U.S. Supreme Court has commented that any person with an internet
connection “can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox.”54 But the realization of this potential
requires much more than broad access to the digital means of speaking.
Without an effective way for speakers to reach an audience and for users to
locate information, the voice of most digital town criers is likely to remain
confined to the empty space of their virtual soapbox. Search engines form a
crucial element of the internet infrastructure that makes information
effectively reachable. While users can reach internet content in other ways,
search engine exposure is the lifeblood of many who offer information
through the internet.55 For large swaths of speech, the size of the audience
depends—dramatically—on the existence and nature of search engine
exposure. As an early influential commentary put it: on the internet, “to
exist is to be indexed by a search engine.”56
The user’s perspective is a mirror image of that of the information
provider. Just as search engines are crucial for allowing information
providers to attract users, they are also indispensable to users in locating
54. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
55. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1164–65; Chandler, supra note 52, at
1107–08.
56. Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of
Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169, 171 (2000).
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information relevant to their interests and needs. Professor James
Grimmelmann has recently described search engines as “advisors.”57
Search engines help users navigate their way through the information flood
of the digital age and find the information that is most relevant for their
preferences.58 Search engines are particularly effective and powerful tools
for this job. They perform their task through (potentially iterative)
interaction with the user and in a way that is highly tailored to the
characteristics and input of each individual.59 As “listeners,” users have a
protected speech interest in unhindered access to others’ speech.60 The
speech interest of users in the functionality of search results, however, goes
beyond that of mere passive listeners or consumers of information.
Depending on their specific architecture, many internet venues enable
commenting, user-provided posts, and other forms of multidirectional
speech, and thereby blur the line between listeners and speakers.61 Users
may interact with internet content or react to it “elsewhere,” on or off the
internet, as in the case of publishing a post on one’s own blog criticizing an
op-ed published in an internet news venue. But in many cases, users may
produce speech that is even more closely entangled with the speech to
which they gained access. This may happen in myriad ways, such as
reacting to blog posts, posting comments to news reports, or taking part in a
decentralized peer-production project. Every user is a potential—and often
actual—speaker vis-à-vis information made accessible by search engines.
Search engines are, thus, vital speech-facilitating tools for both
information providers and users. As a result, they occupy a powerful
information gatekeeper position—a power that is dangerously susceptible to
abuse, both by private parties and the government. Focusing on the latter,
search engines’ gatekeeping position is already widely used by many

57. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 874.
58. See Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 6; see also Chandler, supra note 52, at 1108. It
is important to remember that, because of their role as critical information intermediaries,
search engines not only serve the preferences of users but also inevitably shape them. See
ELKIN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 41, at 72 (“By defining which information
becomes available for each query, search engines may shape preferences, positions, beliefs
and ideas.”); Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1177–78 (analyzing search engines’
shaping of users’ preferences in terms of autonomy).
59. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 894 (“[O]ut of all the ways that speakers and
listeners can find each other, search is the single most listener-directed.”).
60. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas.” (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969))); King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing that
freedom of speech “is also freedom to read”); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir.
2002) (“It is well established that the right to hear—the right to receive information—is no
less protected by the First Amendment than the right to speak.”).
61. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Towards Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 564
(2000) (describing how the internet communication model potentially blurs the line between
information producers and consumers); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet
Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1181 (1999) (explaining that assumptions about the effect of
the internet on decentralization of speech power must be sensitive to the specific
technological architecture involved).
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governments as a censorial tool.62 Some internet speech can be extremely
difficult to regulate,63 but by targeting the intermediary function of search
engines, governments can control its dissemination and access. China is the
most conspicuous example,64 but there are many other countries that order
search engines to filter various websites from the results available within
their territory on different grounds.65
The prospects of similar censorial limitations on search engines in the
United States are not as remote as one may assume. The driving forces
behind this trend are intellectual property infringement and restrictions on
“indecent” materials. Around the turn of the century, the difficulties
associated with controlling information flows over a global decentralized
network led to a trend of limiting access to information by regulating
gatekeepers.66 Internet service providers (ISPs) were the first targets. For
example, several state laws, mostly struck down as unconstitutional,
allowed state authorities to order ISPs to block access to websites
containing materials defined as “harmful to minors.”67 More recently,
search engines, along with other intermediaries, appeared on the radar of
regulators as potential regulative tools for preventing intellectual property
infringement. For example, consider the Stop Online Piracy Act68 (SOPA).
This recently failed legislative attempt to block access to foreign websites
containing infringing materials heavily relied on domestic intermediaries.
The proposed statute included a specific provision empowering a court, on
the initiative of the attorney general, to order a search engine to avoid
linking to a targeted website designated as a “foreign infringing site.”69
Against the backdrop of these trends, a more robust governmental, censorial
use of search engines in the United States does not seem farfetched.70
The crucial point for our purposes is that when government censorship
targets access to information by regulating the search engine’s intermediary
62. Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 379 (2009) (“[M]ost countries
use cybersieves to try to filter undesirable content . . . .”).
63. Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 654 (2003)
(“[T]he Internet’s architecture has prominently stymied control efforts by those harmed by
its less innocuous uses.”).
64. See generally ACCESS DENIED (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008); JACK GOLDSMITH &
TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006);
INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA IN 2004–2005: A COUNTRY STUDY (2005), available at
https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_China_Country_Study.pdf; Bambauer, supra
note 62, at 379; Internet Filtering Country Profile for China, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Aug. 9
2012), https://opennet.net/research/profiles/china-including-hong-kong.
65. See Bambauer, supra note 62, at 382–83.
66. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary
Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 265 (2005); Zittrain, supra note 63, at 654–55; see
also Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence
of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 18 (2003).
67. See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 878–82 (2012)
(surveying examples of the censorship strategy of “deputizing intermediaries” as applied to
ISPs).
68. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
69. See id. § 102(c)(2)(B).
70. See Bambauer, supra note 67, at 866–67 (describing America’s move “to censor the
Internet” through intermediaries).
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function, the relevant speech interest is that of the search engine’s
constituencies: the websites made invisible and the users rendered blind.
No doubt, the First Amendment has an important role to play in this
context. These cases do not implicate freedom of speech, however, because
any protected speech of the search engine is restricted. Rather, the
restrictions imposed on the search engine are merely tools for violating the
speech interests of others.
The speech interests of content providers and users, indirectly targeted in
this way, are surely protectable by the First Amendment. An analogous law
prohibiting the sale of paper to a certain publisher or ordering
manufacturers to incorporate in all TV sets a device that blocks certain
content would, no doubt, implicate the First Amendment.71 The First
Amendment would apply, however, not to protect any speech interest of the
paper maker or the TV manufacturer, but rather because the regulations
target the speech of others.72 An example closer to the search engines
context is the aforementioned early 2000s state legislative attempt to use
ISPs for censorial purposes.
Courts rigorously applied the First
Amendment in those cases not because ISPs’ speech was abridged by the
duty to block certain websites, but because the threat of ISP liability could
be an effective tool for interfering with the speech interests of content
creators and users.73 From the perspective of the speech interest of search
engines’ constituencies, legal limitations on search results must be subject
to First Amendment scrutiny for exactly the same reason.
Identifying the relevant speech interest is not a mere technicality.
Locating the relevant speech interest with the search engine’s constituencies
shapes the analysis and leads to results significantly different from those
produced by a focus on a postulated protected speech interest of the search
engine itself. As a threshold matter, there is the issue of standing. Search
engines that challenge the constitutionality of regulations applied to them
with a First Amendment construct based on protecting the speech interests
of users and websites are third parties asserting the rights of others who are
the direct parties whose speech interest is at issue. As a result, the complex
body of law governing third party standing in First Amendment cases must
be applied to decide whether and when search engines should be allowed to
assert such claims on behalf of others.74
71. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
591 (1983) (holding that a “use tax” on ink and paper that singled out newspapers violated
the First Amendment).
72. See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 713, 721–22 (2000) (discussing First Amendment scrutiny triggered by the
instrumental effect of a regulated subject matter on free-speech-relevant media).
73. See, e.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 1999); Ctr. for
Democracy and Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 656 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Cyberspace
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 748–49 (E.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d, 238 F.3d
420 (6th Cir. 2000); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
74. Traditionally, standing to bring a suit has been reserved to a plaintiff who can “aver
an injury peculiar to himself.” Tyler v. Judges of the Ct. of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406
(1900). But the strict requirement precluding third-party standing has softened over the last
century in American jurisprudence. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party
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Even assuming, arguendo, that search engines have standing, taking the
speech interest of constituencies as the focal point of the analysis still
matters a great deal. One major element of the analysis where this
difference plays out is the question of content neutrality. Whether a
regulation of speech is content based or content neutral determines the level
of constitutional scrutiny applied and often decides the outcome of the First
Amendment analysis.75 When the focus of the analysis is the speech of
websites and users, the critical element of content neutrality has to be
determined in reference to the speech of those parties. From this
perspective, many regulations that seek to use search engines as a censorial
tool against websites’ and users’ speech will be content based and,
therefore, subject to the exacting standard applied to such regulations.76
Ordering search engines to exclude from their results certain materials that
are deemed “harmful to minors,” for example, clearly targets specific
speech on the basis of its content. As a result, such regulations will have to
meet a particularly stringent test to pass constitutional muster. By contrast,
regulations purporting to remedy alleged search engine manipulations77 will
often be content neutral with respect to the speech of users and websites.
For example, a general limitation on the search engine’s ability to give a
ranking preference to its commercial allies seems to be prima facie content
neutral in regard to the speech of the search engine’s constituencies: the
regulation applies completely independent of the content of websites’ or
users’ speech. As a result, regulations of this kind, when analyzed from the
perspective of the search engine constituencies’ speech interests, will
usually be scrutinized under the relatively lenient standard applicable to
content-neutral laws and will likely pass muster. This is not a mere quirk or
unpredictable result of the doctrine. As a normative matter, when the
substantive focus is the speech of constituencies, regulations that do not
target a particular view or content embodied in the speech of information
providers or users are less suspicious and should be subject to the more
lenient review standard.
Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984) (chronicling the diminishing requirements needed
for a party to assert in court the rights of another). In First Amendment jurisprudence, the
requirement of an injury-in-fact has been particularly blunted by several exceptions and
mitigating doctrines. See Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 748–55 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing
factors relevant for third-party standing in the context of the First Amendment). For a
discussion of third-party standing in the context of free speech overbreadth doctrine, see
Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Note, Overbreadth and Listeners
Rights, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (2010).
75. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20 (3d ed. 2010); 1
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:1 (2012) (“The
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulation of speech is one of the
central tenets of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Martin H. Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
76. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The
Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest.”).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51.
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The foregoing analysis means neither that any regulation that targets
constituencies’ speech on the basis of its content is always unconstitutional,
nor that any attempt to restrict search results that is content neutral in regard
to the speech of constituencies is allowed. Consider a hypothetical myopic
legislator who decides that a good way of remedying what he perceives as
the problem of search bias is to compel search engines to randomize the
ranking of search results (whether across users or across multiple searches
by one user). Such a regulation is neutral in regard to the content of speech
by the search engine’s constituencies. But its incidental effect is potentially
so destructive78 to the relevant speech interest—that of users to effectively
locate sought-out websites and of websites to effectively reach interested
audiences—that the regulation likely violates the First Amendment.79 Such
a regulation is analogous to mandating that all books must be printed using
dissolving ink or that all TV sets must block three channels on a random,
rotating basis. Not all content-neutral regulations of speech are allowed
under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, a focus on the speech of the
search engines’ constituencies allows much breathing space for regulations
that do not target the speech interest of websites or users in a content-based
manner.
The speech interest of the search engines’ constituencies—both
information providers and users—merits vigilant protection against blatant
or subtle governmental attempts to use search engines as censorial tools.
Yet an analysis focused on this speech interest allows much room for
regulations of search results that do not attempt to target specific speech of
the search engine’s constituencies. This is exactly the reason why Google
and its defenders mostly ignored this understanding of the relevant speech
interest in the debate over search engines’ complete control of their results.
With a clear focus on the plausible and natural speech interests at stake—
those belonging to websites and users—the First Amendment is hardly an
impenetrable shield against virtually any legal attempt to scrutinize search
practices. Hence, search engine proponents needed greener pastures in the
form of more creative speech arguments.

78. A limited element of randomization is not necessarily destructive to the quality of
search results, and arguably if it is well designed, it may even improve search results’
quality. See generally Sandeep Pandey et al., Shuffling a Stacked Deck: The Case for
Partially Randomized Ranking of Search Engine Results, 31 VLDB CONF. (2005)
(suggesting that the introduction of a controlled amount of randomness into search result
ranking methods may improve their quality).
79. In doctrinal terms, such regulation is likely to fail one of the prongs of the test
applied to content-neutral laws because it is probably not narrowly tailored to achieve the
legitimate state interest underlying it. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
662 (1994) (“[A] content-neutral regulation will be sustained if ‘it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’” (quoting United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))).
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2. The Editorial Search Engine
How could the speech interest of the search engine itself, rather than that
of its constituencies, be the center of First Amendment analysis? One
answer that has emerged in the recent search battles is to treat the search
engine as an editor of content—the equivalent of the New York Times or an
organizer of a parade.80 This construct separates the speech and the speech
interest. The relevant speech is that of the websites indexed by the search
engine, but the protected speech interest belongs to the search engine itself
in its editorial capacity. This move builds on a strand of the case law that
extends First Amendment protection to editors’ discretion to control their
speech venue by deciding what speech to include or exclude. The seminal
case is Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,81 where the Supreme
Court found unconstitutional a “right of reply” statute that compelled
newspapers to publish responses to certain included content.82
The Tornillo rule combines two analytically distinct elements. The first
is the assumption that freedom of speech is not limited to censorial attempts
to suppress certain speech, but extends also to attempts to compel speech.
The underlying rationale is that genuine freedom to express one’s ideas and
views includes a negative as well as a positive dimension. Truly protecting
this freedom requires both that individuals can choose what to say and that
they are free to decide what not to say.83 By extension, this rationale also
applies to attempts to dictate the mode of inclusion or prominence given to
certain content.84 The second element of the rule is that it applies not just
to cases where someone is compelled to generate certain content or directly
express it, but also to cases where one is compelled to include, within her
speech venue, other speakers’ generated and expressed speech.85 While
newspapers are the classic editorial entities enjoying protection against
compelled speech generated by others, the rule has been extended to other
entities, including the organizers of parades,86 and even business entities

80. See generally VOLOKH & FALK, supra note 51; Bruce D. Brown & Alan B.
Davidson, Is Google Like Gas or Like Steel?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at A17 (“[S]earch
engines need to make choices about what results are most relevant to a query, just as a news
editor must decide which stories deserve to be on the front page.”). The editor argument also
animates the Langdon decision, although the opinion simply cites several cases involving
compelled speech of editors and leaves its underlying reasoning somewhat obscure. See
Langdon v. Google, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629 (D. Del. 2007).
81. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
82. Id. at 258.
83. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573–74
(1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (“[A]ll speech
inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid.”); W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[The First
Amendment] includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
all.”).
84. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258; VOLOKH & FALK, supra note 51, at 8–9.
85. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (holding that “an edited compilation of speech generated
by other persons” is protected under the First Amendment).
86. See id. at 557.
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distributing standard informational materials.87 One federal district court
has already ruled that search engines’ results are protected speech under this
logic, although in a conclusory manner and without clarifying the exact
nature of the relevant speech.88 The court in Langdon v. Google, Inc.,
citing to the editorial rights of newspapers cases, found that any attempt to
interfere with the search engine’s discretion over its results through
injunctive relief “would compel it to speak” and is therefore precluded by
the First Amendment.89
At first blush, recasting search engines as editors may seem a winning
move. A search engine, no doubt, selects (by way of inclusion in and
exclusion from the search results) and arranges (by way of ranking) the
content of websites to which users arrive through its services. In this
limited sense, search results constitute an editorial product. Any attempt to
deny the search engine the protection extended to other editors may seem
based on irrelevant distinctions that have no foothold in the law, such as the
fact that search results are produced by a computer algorithm or that their
creation involves interaction with users. But such a hasty conclusion
ignores both legal doctrine and the rationale behind it. The case law in this
area extends protection to one entity vis-à-vis speech generated and
expressed by others on the basis of an explicit rationale: the existence of a
layer of expression that is attributable to the editorial entity itself, rather
than to those who generated the speech. Just as the case law acknowledges
that this rationale requires extending the rule to contexts beyond the core
case of a newspaper, it also warns against applying the rule where the
rationale does not apply.90
When does the rationale based on the assumption of an expressive layer
attributable to the editor apply? Two main situations appear in the case
law, neither of which is applicable to search engines. The first and most
common situation is when the entity that controls the speech venue, by
virtue of its editorial position, is likely to be associated with the content.91
We plausibly speak of a New York Times article even when the author of
the article is not an employee of the Times. It is plausible that many
associate the New York Times with its op-eds, and even with the
87. See Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 1.
88. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
89. Id. at 629–30.
90. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62
(2006) (holding that a law denying federal funds to higher education institutions that refused
on-campus access to military recruiters “is a far cry from the compelled speech” precedents);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655–57 (1994) (distinguishing a regulation of
a cable provider from compelled speech precedents).
91. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65 (holding that the compelled speech rule does not apply
where there is little likelihood that “the views of those engaging in the expressive activities
would be identified” with the venue owner); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575 (observing that
admitting the plaintiff to the parade was likely to be perceived as a result of the organizer’s
determination “that its message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as
well”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 655 (holding that the rule against compelled
speech does not apply when there is little risk that cable viewers would think that must-carry
channels “convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator”).
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advertisements it carries, even if they understand that the content was not
produced by its employees. Given the practices of journalism, the
newspaper is seen as endorsing the speech, or at least as associating itself
with it in a meaningful way. This rationale may apply in other contexts
beyond the core case of a newspaper, but it does not apply in all cases when
a speech venue is forced to host unwanted content. Most people do not
associate a Yellow Pages directory with the speech offered by the entities
listed in it, even if the directory engages in some selection and arrangement
of its index. The Court has refused to apply editorial speech protection in
cases in which the relevant entity is unlikely to be seen as an editor of the
speech in the sense of being plausibly associated with it by others.92
Two related criteria, developed by courts for separating the goats, where
this rationale does not apply, from the sheep, where it mandates protection,
point in a clear direction when applied to the case of search engines. First,
no compelled speech argument lies where there is “little likelihood that the
views of those engaging in the expressive activities would be identified
with” the entity claiming the protection of the First Amendment.93 In
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, the Supreme
Court rejected an argument by law schools that the First Amendment
protected their right to exclude military recruiters from campus because
allowing their presence could send a message of identification with the
military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.94 The Court distinguished the
compelled speech precedents by observing, “Nothing about recruiting
suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters” and that
nothing “restricts what the law schools may say about the military’s
policies.”95
Search engines stand in a similar position in regard to the content of
individual websites they index. Users are unlikely to associate the content
of indexed websites with the search engine. Nor do they have a plausible
reason to do so. Because of their “advisory” function,96 search engines play
a somewhat more active role than cable providers, which are seen in the
case law as the paradigmatic example of completely passive conduits for
delivering content by others.97 Nevertheless, in regard to the crucial
element of an association with the content being carried or linked, search
engines are the equivalent of cable providers. This follows from the nature
of the “advice” provided by search engines. The ideal function of the
search engine for its users is in locating materials most relevant for their
own preferences.
Rather than providing its own evaluation and
endorsement of websites or trying to convince users of particular
assessments of their content, the search engine tries to present to the user
92. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62–65; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 655–56;
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
93. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65.
94. Id. at 64–65.
95. Id. at 65.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.
97. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 553, 576 (1995);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 655.
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links to the content most relevant for her own subjective preferences, as
inferred from the search term and other relevant data.98 At play here is the
difference between you responding to me asking which is the best movie in
town with an enthusiastic recommendation, and you naming three movies in
response to my question: “You know my idiosyncratic taste in movies,
which ones do you think I’ll enjoy the most?” Search engines are
analogous to the latter case. It is their “mind-reading” quality, at least as
they are perceived by users, that makes it highly unlikely that users
associate the search engine with the content of the websites it lists or
assume any endorsement or editorial discretion in regard to such content.99
In some cases, search engines receive substantial public criticism over the
material they list and link to in their search results.100 There is a crucial
difference, however, between associating a controversial content of a listed
website with the search engine and recognizing that the search engine has
the power to reduce the visibility of this content. The best-known public
claims against Google in such cases seem to be in the latter vein.101
In other contexts, search engines stress their disassociation from the
content they list and rely on that disassociation. To avoid liability
stemming from the content they index, usually under tort or intellectual
property laws, search engines regularly take the position that they are not
associated with that content as either publishers or editors.102 It is hardly
98. See Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 894 (“The entire point of consulting a search
engine is that the user specifies her own interests—not someone else’s—in the search query
and receives results relating to those interests.”).
99. Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8
YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 198 (2006) (referring to the “mind reading abilities” of search
engines). In practice, search engines’ ranking is not completely deferential to users’
preferences and interests. But to maintain their appeal and avoid losing users, search engines
must maintain both the user perception of fidelity to users’ interests and a considerable
degree of actual such fidelity. Cf. id. at 196 (“Search engines that disappoint . . . are
accountable to fickle searchers.”).
100. Famously, in 2004, Google came under fire when it was revealed that the search
results for the term “Jew” listed at a high rank a highly anti-Semitic website. Following a
public outcry, Google resisted demands for removing the controversial result and published
an online statement called An Explanation of Our Search Results, in which it explained,
“The beliefs and preferences of those who work at Google, as well as the opinions of the
general public, do not determine or impact our search results.” See An Explanation of Our
Search Results, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/explanation.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2014). For a discussion of the public controversy, see SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE
GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) 64–66 (2011).
101. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 100, at 66 (criticizing Google for the high
visibility of an anti-Semitic website in response to certain search queries because the results
“are clearly within Google’s control”).
102. See Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 835 (3d Cir. 2007). Search engines
rely on two main statutory safe havens in this context. Section 230 of the Communication
Decency Act mandates that the provider of an “interactive computer service” shall not be
treated as the speaker or publisher of any information provided by another. 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1) (2006). Section 512(d) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act immunizes
providers of “information location tools” from monetary relief for copyright infringement.
17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2012). A search engine does not qualify for the immunity under certain
circumstances, including when it has actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing
activity. Withdrawing the immunity where the search engine possesses knowledge and
allowing certain injunctive relief is consistent with the treatment of the search engine as a
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consistent for search engines to disclaim the legal responsibilities of editors
and publishers while also claiming the free speech protection extended to
them.103
Some auxiliary indicators that courts sometimes find relevant to the
question of association between a presumed editor and compelled content
point in the same direction. In the unlikely event that a concern of
association between the search engine and indexed content does arise,
search engines can easily disavow any such connection.104 Similarly,
should a search engine choose to provide its own speech, either by way of
supplying alternative content to indexed websites or as substantive
endorsements of websites, nothing in the regulations contemplated here
interferes with its ability to do so.105
The second situation where courts are willing to assume a separate layer
of expression attributable to the editor is when the edited content constitutes
a collective expressive entity—a whole that is greater, or at least distinct,
from the sum of its parts. The case law distinguishes between two kinds of
expressive venues. The first is a mere content aggregator, which just
collects expressive materials as discrete audience-selectable units. The
second is a content compiler, which collects and combines content into a
collective whole imbued with an overarching meaning.106 In the latter case,
even when the entity controlling the venue is not required to express
endorsement of any particular material and is not likely to be seen as its
originator, specific speech is forced upon it. The audience may still
plausibly associate this entity with the expressive whole because of its
editorial capacity in shaping its meaning. The meaning of this whole is
necessarily shaped by the units included in it, contrary to the editor’s
preference. Thus, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group, the Supreme Court found that a parade organizer had a protected
First Amendment interest to exclude a gay organization from participating
in the parade because “[u]nlike the programming offered on various
channels by a cable network, the parade does not consist of individual,
unrelated segments that happen to be transmitted together for individual
selection by members of the audience.”107 Irrespective of the attribution of
any individual unit, the court explained, “the parade’s overall message is
passive instrument for reaching content rather than a publisher or editor associated with it. A
duty to act in cases of knowledge under threat of liability and injunctive relief ordering the
disabling of access to linked content treat the search engine as an enforcement tool rather
than an entity associated with the content. This roughly tracks the concept of treating the
search engine as an important instrument that affects the speech interest of others in the First
Amendment context. See supra text accompanying notes 62–73. First Amendment
protection that is focused on the speech interest of search engine constituencies and the
limited liability for infringing content are thus matching aspects of seeing the search engine
as an instrumentality for speech by others rather than a speaker, editor, or publisher.
103. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1192–93; Wu, supra note 24, at 1528–29.
104. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995).
105. See id. at 580; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 23–24
(1986); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
106. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576–77.
107. Id. at 576.
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distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s
expression is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.”108 In short,
whether or not the editor is seen as endorsing a specific unit, the forced
inclusion of a unit changes the overall meaning of the whole. Critically,
however, this only applies where there is an overarching expressive whole
that is attributable to the editor, unlike in the case of the cable provider.
Search engines are aggregators, rather than compilers. Websites indexed
by search engines, unlike a parade or a newspaper, lack the quality of an
integrated expressive whole with which the entity controlling the venue is
associated. While the search engine selects and hierarchically organizes the
items listed in search results, users do not perceive the websites linked in
them as an integrated whole with an overarching meaning. No one runs a
Bing search to experience the overall meaning of a “compilation” made of
the group of websites collected by the results of the search. And if someone
does, she is unlikely to see Microsoft as the editor of this postulated
“compilation” of websites. Websites on search results, much like the
individual channels of a cable provider, are discrete units offered for
selection by users. If users likely do not associate search engines with the
content of individual websites, then this is the end of the analysis. Unlike
the parade in Hurley, there is no greater expressive whole with which a
search engine is likely to be associated whose meaning is shaped by the
forced inclusion of a unit.
In sum, when the speech embodied in indexed websites is taken as the
relevant frame of reference, search engines do not qualify for First
Amendment protection given to editors against compelled speech.109
Search engines are not plausibly associated with the content of indexed
websites or seen as endorsing this content. Nor is there any integrated
expressive whole attributable to the search engine whose meaning is altered
by a forced inclusion irrespective of association of the search engine with
individual expressive units.
3. The Opinionated Search Engine
Setting aside either search engines’ constituencies or the search engine in
an editorial capacity as the protected speech interest, one last speech
argument remains. This is, by far, the most creative, powerful, and
dangerous argument. It argues that each search result ranking embodies
implied observations of relevance in response to the search query, and that
these observations are protectable speech. Thus, in 2003, a federal district
court found that Google’s search results rankings “are opinions—opinions
of the significance of particular web sites as they correspond to a search
query,” and that “[o]ther search engines express different opinions” based

108. Id. at 577.
109. A number of scholars have come to the same conclusion. See Bracha & Pasquale,
supra note 44, at 1190–92; Chandler, supra note 52, at 1126–29; Wu, supra note 24, at
1528–29.
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on their methods of ranking websites.110 The argument rests on the premise
that search results presented to users contain several layers of meaning.
The top layer of meaning—that of denotation—consists of the immediate
meaning communicated to users by the textual or visual information
presented.111 In textual searches, this typically includes the title of indexed
websites, their URLs, and a short description. But this information (that the
indexed websites themselves typically generate) is not the speech in which
protection is claimed.
The underlying layer of meaning—that of
connotation—contains a different expressive message: propositions about
the order of relevance of the listed websites for users’ preferences in the
context of the particular search query.112 This connotative meaning can be
stylistically represented as: “website X is most relevant to this user in
regard to this search; website Y is next in relevance; etc.” This meaning
that is clearly generated by the search engine itself, the argument goes, is
the protected speech.
This construct offers the best of all possible universes from the point of
view of search engines. Unlike the editorial search engine argument, it
identifies the protected speech with expression directly generated by the
search engine, thereby avoiding the fatal flaw of claiming protection vis-àvis speech whose association with the search engine is dubious. By contrast
to the construct focusing on the speech of search engines’ constituencies, it
locates the protected speech interest with the search engine, thereby making
almost any attempt to limit search engine discretion suspect. When
observations of relevance are taken as the protected expression, almost any
imaginable interference with the search engine’s control of its results is
inexorably intertwined with an abridgment of its speech. An external
constraint shaping the search results in any way necessarily shapes the
observations of relevance embodied in them. Moreover, since the
observations of relevance are targeted because of their content, any
regulation of the kind contemplated by this Article is content based in
respect to this expression and therefore subject to the more exacting level of
scrutiny. In short, this version of the First Amendment argument, if
successful, emerges as a true doomsday weapon capable of quashing any
attempt to limit search engines’ absolute discretion over their results.
But is the argument successful? Are implied observations of relevance
the kind of speech that the First Amendment protects? Professor Stuart
Benjamin has recently answered this question with a resounding yes.113
According to Benjamin, First Amendment jurisprudence criteria
determining what kind of speech receives protection yield a clear result in

110. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27193, at *11 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 17, 2002).
111. On denotation, see ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY 89–90 (Annette
Lavers & Colin Smith trans., 1983).
112. On connotation, see id.
113. Benjamin, supra note 16, at 1446–67.
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this case.114 Protected speech under the First Amendment includes any
communication of a substantive message from a speaker to a listener who
can potentially recognize the message.115 This broad definition of covered
speech is limited only by a narrow and strict list of well-recognized
exceptions such as obscenity or sedition.116 Courts are hostile to any
attempt to expand this narrow list of exceptions. In a series of recent
decisions, the Supreme Court demonstrated such hostility when it
adamantly rejected any attempt to expand the limited list of categories of
uncovered speech or to restrict protection to speech not within these
categories on the basis of various distinctions.117
Arguably, the application of this framework to our context is
straightforward. Implied observations of relevance embodied in search
results communicate a substantive message from the search engine, a
message that is potentially understandable and, most often, actually
understandable by users. This communication does not fall within any of
the traditional categories of speech excluded from the ambit of the First
Amendment. No other distinction, such as the existence or absence of a
clear articulable viewpoint or the subject matter of the message, is relevant.
Therefore, search engine rankings constitute protected speech under the
First Amendment. End of debate.
Except that it is not. As a doctrinal matter, applicable law, far from being
as clear as the above analysis implies, constitutes one of the darkest and
most obscure corners of First Amendment doctrine. Underlying normative
considerations point clearly against construing the relevant rules in a way
that extends First Amendment protection to search engines’ implied
observations of relevance and to a large universe of similar communication.
And existing law already contains, in an embryonic form, the mechanisms
for denying First Amendment protection to this sort of communication
without running the risks that the Supreme Court’s narrow approach to
categories of excluded speech is designed to avoid. The remainder of this
Article elaborates, in turn, on each of these propositions.

114. See id. at 1447 (“[T]he First Amendment encompasses a great swath of algorithmbased decisions—specifically, algorithm-based outputs that entail a substantive
communication.”).
115. See id. at 1458–61. The seminal Supreme Court case often read as standing for this
proposition is Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (holding that the First
Amendment applies when “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and
in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it”).
116. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (describing a limited list of
“historic and traditional categories [of excluded speech] long familiar to the bar”).
117. Id. at 1586 (rejecting “a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech
outside the scope of the First Amendment”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537, 2547 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (“[N]ew
categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes
certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”).
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II. WHY SEARCH ENGINE RANKINGS ARE NOT PROTECTABLE SPEECH
As a doctrinal matter, it is far from clear that First Amendment law
extends protection to implied observations of relevance embodied in search
results. In part, free speech protection is limited because the regulation
might be targeting one of the traditional categories of unprotected speech.
Under current circumstances, much of the communication singled out for
regulation is likely to constitute deception or fraud—a category of speech in
regard to which First Amendment exclusionary rules allow much leeway
for regulation.118 In the long run, however, deception may be an unreliable
foundation. Changed circumstances may eliminate the deceptive nature of
certain manipulations of search results but not the manipulation. Moreover,
the concept of deception is ill suited for dealing with the greater
implications of the extremely broad interpretation of the First Amendment
claimed by proponents of search engines’ speech.
A more fundamental basis for excluding search ranking is the concept of
First Amendment coverage. Many commentators acknowledge that the
First Amendment does not cover a vast amount of communication that is
well beyond the traditional categories of excluded speech.119 The
regulation of uncovered speech does not trigger any level of First
Amendment scrutiny.120 Unfortunately, legal doctrine on this subject is
opaque. In the rare cases when courts have to deal with arguments about
uncovered speech, they typically use evasive measures and technical
classifications to avoid free speech analysis.121 The sweeping claim for
protection of search engine speech no longer allows obscuring the question
of coverage in this way. The only satisfactory way of answering the
question, for whose resolution no clear guidance exists in the case law, is
through normative analysis. Building on Robert Post’s concept of First
Amendment–relevant social practices, I argue that a close look at the actual
social practices of search engine “opinions” reveals no normative ground
for their inclusion within the protective zone of freedom of speech.
Moreover, the broader implications of such an inclusion may be disastrous.
Implied observations of relevance of the kind embodied in search results are
found almost everywhere. If the First Amendment is construed to cover
such speech, almost no social or economic practice will be beyond its reach,
and almost no governmental, economic, or social regulation will be free of
the exacting standard of First Amendment scrutiny.
These arguments hinge on the specific social practices of search engine
speech, not on the abstract quality of the speech as having been generated
by a computer algorithm. As such, this analysis operates on a much more
118. See infra text accompanying notes 122–23.
119. See infra notes 149–50.
120. See Schauer, supra note 20, at 1769 (explaining that, when a case is not covered by
the First Amendment, “the entire event—an event that often involves ‘speech’ in the
ordinary language sense of the word—does not present a First Amendment issue at all, and
the government’s action is consequently measured against no First Amendment standard
whatsoever”).
121. See infra notes 153–54.
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fine-grained level than arguments that treat “algorithmic speech” or
“machine speech” as homogenous categories that determine whether the
First Amendment applies. My argument is that the specific social practices
of search engine ranking are not sufficiently connected to any free speech
values to justify First Amendment coverage. It leaves open the possibility
that other forms of algorithm and machine speech are covered by the First
Amendment. What matters is not the general characterization of speech as
algorithmic, but rather the specific social interactions between speakers and
users within which it takes place.
A. Fraud
James Grimmelmann has recently explained that much of the
manipulation under attack by critics of search engines may actually
constitute deception of users.122 How is deception possible in regard to
opinions of relevance? As one federal court observed in Search King, Inc.
v. Google Technology, Inc.,123 search results are “fundamentally subjective
in nature” because “every algorithm employed by every search engine is
different, and will produce a different representation of the relative
significance of a particular web site depending on the various factors.”124
There is no single, correct, objective answer to the question of relevance,
and therefore it seems that there are no false answers. The point of the
Search King court’s reference to search ranking as subjective “opinions” is
to classify it as the equivalent of beliefs, values, and taste-judgments where
“there is no such thing as a false idea,” in contrast to “false statements of
fact.”125 What work can the concept of deception do in regard to such
subjective approximations of relevance? As Grimmelmann explains, even
in the absence of an objective yardstick for relevance, rankings can still be
subjectively false. This happens when a search engine changes the ranking
of a website in a way that is inconsistent with its “own assessment of
relevance.”126 Search engines represent both explicitly and implicitly that
their results are based on relevance to users,127 so producing results that by
the search engine’s own lights do not meet this criterion is a false
representation.
Grimmelmann sees deception predominantly as a litmus test for deciding
when, as a policy matter, interfering with the search engine’s discretion is
justified. But the category of deception has another merit: it happens to be
one of the traditionally recognized content-based categories where courts, at
122. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 926–32.
123. No. Civ-02-1457-m, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
124. Id. at *10.
125. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974). Indeed, Google itself,
apparently attuned to the First Amendment implications, has changed its official line from
describing its ranking algorithm as objectively measuring facts to presenting it as a
manifestation of subjective opinions. See Cade Metz, Google Drops Nuke on ‘Objective’
Search Engine Utopia, REGISTER (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/12/16/
google_algorithms_are_google_opinions/.
126. Grimmelmann, supra note 14, at 926.
127. Id. at 929.
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least when some additional elements are present, are willing to limit the
application of the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has observed
that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been
protected for its own sake,”128 and has consistently mentioned this category
as one of the limited areas where the law has “permitted restrictions upon
the content of speech.”129 As the Court recently emphasized, false speech
is not excluded wholesale from protection under the First Amendment.130
Thus the intersection between the First Amendment and civil wrongs
involving misrepresentation is more complex than a sweeping denial of
First Amendment protection to any false communication. In fact, the case
law requires varying degrees of fault for imposing constitutionally sound
civil liability, depending on various factors, such as the nature and context
of the speech, the wrong involved, and the remedy sought.131 This makes
little difference in our context, however. Search results deception ipso facto
involves the highest degree of fault: knowing, intentional misrepresentation
or “malice.” The falsity here requires a representation that rankings are
based solely on relevance, when knowingly, under the search engine’s own
subjective criteria, they are not. Malice—the highest degree of fault applied
by courts—is built into the definition.132 It follows that when the regulation
at issue targets deception by search engines, any First Amendment defense
falls flat.
Deception is an important concept that can serve as a temporary stopgap
measure for neutralizing the debilitating effect of the First Amendment on
any regulation of search results. Presently, many of the practices that critics
of search engine manipulation seek to regulate may be fairly described as
involving fraud in the sense explained above. For several reasons,
however, it is a partial remedy and in the long run probably no remedy at
all.
First, there may be policy reasons, both user oriented and website
oriented, for restricting certain manipulations of search results independent
128. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
129. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); see also Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
130. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546–47 (2012) (observing that “[s]ome
false speech may be prohibited,” but rejecting “the notion that false speech should be in a
general category that is presumptively unprotected”).
131. Famously, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court required actual malice for
defamation liability arising out of a false statement by a newspaper about a public official on
a matter of public concern. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). In the
case of compensatory damages for a false statement by media about a private individual, the
Court left it to state law to require a lower level of fault. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337; see also
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755–61 (1985) (plurality
opinion) (allowing punitive damages for a defamatory statement on a matter of private
concern in the absence of malice). The effect of the First Amendment on torts other than
defamation is a source of a separate set of rules and disputes about the appropriate standard.
See generally Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650 (2009).
132. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 930–31.
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of a concern about fraud or misrepresentation.133 To the extent that
regulations motivated by these reasons target practices that do not involve
fraud per se, they can no longer enjoy this escape route from the shadow of
the First Amendment.
Second, and more fundamentally, as explained below, the broad theory
behind the opinions of relevance argument threatens to extends First
Amendment scrutiny to vast areas of economic and social regulation, well
beyond the realm of search engine ranking.134 Even those whose concern
in the search engine context is limited to fraud may recognize other policy
interests worthy of protection in this broader context. Yet if its application
is only limited by the fraud category, the First Amendment will form a
formidable barrier for regulation in those other areas.
Most importantly, deception is a dynamic concept, dependent on
contingent social circumstances. What is deceptive today, especially on the
basis of implicit representations, may not be deceptive tomorrow when
social circumstances and public expectations shift. As Ellen Goodman
explains in the analogous context of stealth marketing, “[c]onsumer savvy
reduces deception by unmasking what was once hidden.”135 Whether users
assume that search results are solely based on relevance and are completely
free of bad faith deviance from that criterion is an empirical question.
However, to the extent that complaints about search engine manipulation
become more publicly visible, as they have in recent years, public
skepticism is likely to grow. As users become less trusting of search
engines’ practices, they are less likely to expect purely relevance-based
ranking, and therefore they are less likely to be deceived when results are in
fact not purely relevance based.136 Whether we have reached this point is
debatable, but deception alone becomes a shaky long-term foundation for
escaping First Amendment scrutiny.
Note that even those whose policy concerns focus solely on deceptive
search engine practices are unlikely to be consoled by deception dissolving
simply due to a changing baseline of public skepticism. As a policy
concern, opacity is just as bad as full-fledged fraud. Users who expect
search engines to deviate from strict relevance-based results are not
deceived when this, in fact, happens. If I tell you, “I recommend to you this
model of a vacuum cleaner on the basis of an undisclosed mixture of
considerations about your own preferences and my personal interests,” I am
not deceiving you. You may regard the recommendation (and my personal
character) as dubious and (rightly) feel manipulated, but you have no claim
Users, however, are still harmed under these
of deception.137
133. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1171–79 (discussing various policy
concerns applicable to search ranking manipulation); Pasquale, supra note 43, at 112–24
(same).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 155–58.
135. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83,
112 (2006).
136. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1177.
137. Thus, Grimmelmann is too quick to argue that to be a disclaimer effective at
revealing the search engine’s incomplete adherence to user’s relevance “would need to
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circumstances, especially when they have no idea how the results deviate
from a strict relevance standard. The harm is twofold. First, users receive
results that (by the search engine’s own lights) are less than fully geared
toward serving their interest. Second, this dynamic will likely result in
more general erosion of users’ trust in search results, which would be
attributable to their growing expectation of manipulation.138 Ironically, the
latter harm is exacerbated when users are not deceived, but are kept in the
dark in regard to the details of the manipulations to which they are
subjected.
There are, in short, substantial harms associated with
manipulation.139 But it is unlikely that courts, employing their narrow and
guarded approach to excluded categories of speech, will be willing to
interpret the category of fraud broadly as encompassing cases of
manipulation through opacity not involving fraud in the strict sense.
As the likelihood of fraud dissipates with shifting public expectations, so
does the impediment for applying the First Amendment. The net result is
that deception-based analysis has little mitigating effect on the far-reaching
use of the First Amendment. In the short run, the exclusion of deceptive
speech does not save a broad array of regulations, beyond the context of
search, from the incredibly broad theory of freedom of speech on which the
claim for search results as protected opinions rests. In the long run, it does
not even save antideception-oriented regulations of search engine ranking.
B. Coverage
The fatal flaw of the opinionated search engine construct resides on a
more fundamental level of First Amendment doctrine. It is possible to read
certain Supreme Court opinions as affirming an extremely expansive
version of the scope of the First Amendment.140 One recent example is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,141 commonly read
as standing for the broad proposition that any information is speech
protected under the First Amendment.142 Taking this proposition together
affirmatively reveal the other considerations entering into a ranking.” Grimmelmann, supra
note 12, at 931. An explicit disclaimer or, alternatively, a general public awareness, under
which users become aware of incomplete adherence to relevance but are kept in the dark
about its details puts an end to deception in the strict sense. Manipulation may still persist in
the absence of a detailed disclosure. While manipulation may be a policy concern, unlike
deception, it is unlikely to be a ground for removing otherwise applicable First Amendment
protection from speech.
138. See Goodman, supra note 135, at 113 (describing in the analogous context of stealth
marketing how widespread public skepticism results in harm to public discourse because it
“degrades a communications environment in which participants are unnecessarily
disbelieving”).
139. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1177–79 (describing manipulation of
search results as harm to users’ autonomy).
140. See Benjamin, supra note 16, at 1455 (observing that it is striking “how broadly the
Court has interpreted the scope of the Free Speech Clause, particularly in recent years, with
the result that one can fairly answer most of the questions about algorithms without relying
on any particular theories of the First Amendment”).
141. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (“[C]reation and dissemination of information are speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment.”).
142. Id. at 2667.
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with other recent decisions that emphasize the narrow nature of excluded
categories of speech,143 one may conclude that Supreme Court
jurisprudence conclusively disposes of the question of search ranking as
protected speech. Yet, when these decisions are read against the broader
background of First Amendment law, some aspects of which they never
directly addressed, their supposed literal and conclusive resolution of the
question of search engine speech dissolves. Specifically, these Supreme
Court decisions did not address the issue of First Amendment coverage.
It is widely acknowledged that the First Amendment does not cover all
instances of regulatory constraints on communication that falls within the
case law’s broad definition of expression.144 In a typical recent case, the
Seventh Circuit described a claim that a prison deprived a prisoner of his
First Amendment rights by preventing him from ordering his broker to sell
stock as “absurd”; this, explained Judge Richard Posner, “is not the kind of
verbal act that the First Amendment protects.”145 But the prisoner’s verbal
order clearly constitutes a substantive message communicated to another by
whom it is potentially understandable. It certainly satisfies the oft-quoted
Spence v. Washington test for speech requiring an “intent to convey a
particularized message” and likelihood “that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”146 Nor does the communication fall
within one of the traditional categories of excluded speech. How then could
the court so easily dismiss the free speech claim as “absurd”?
The answer is simple: contrary to Professor Benjamin’s assertion,147 not
every communication that qualifies as speech and falls outside the excluded
categories is protected by the First Amendment. Scholars have long
acknowledged that satisfying the definition of speech is not a sufficient
condition for triggering the First Amendment.148 They refer to the
boundary separating abridgment of speech that triggers the First
Amendment from that which does not as “coverage.”149 Uncovered speech
is the dark matter of freedom of speech. It is everywhere in vast amounts,
but it is almost never noticed.150 It includes an enormous quantity of
communication that falls within the definition of speech, such as speech
restricted by securities regulation, speech within the ambit of regulation of

143. See cases cited supra notes 85–87.
144. See generally sources cited infra notes 149–50.
145. King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005).
146. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–12 (1974).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 113–15.
148. Post, supra note 22, at 1252 (“[The test for speech] cannot plausibly be said to
express a sufficient condition for bringing ‘the First Amendment into play.’”).
149. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89–92 (1982);
Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1081,
1089–90 (1983) (discussing “[b]oundaries questions about the first amendment”); Post,
supra note 72, at 713; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in
Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267–82 (1981); see also Post, supra note 22; Schauer,
supra note 20.
150. See Schauer, supra note 20, at 1768 (“[T]he speech with which the First Amendment
deals is the exception and the speech that may routinely be regulated is the rule.”).
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various professionals, or speech that constitutes criminal conspiracy and
solicitation.151
Thus, free speech jurisprudence contains two filters that prevent the
triggering of First Amendment scrutiny even when regulation of
communication within the definition of speech is involved. The more
visible filter is that of exclusionary categories. But the second filter—that
of coverage—removes from First Amendment scrutiny a vastly greater
amount of speech. Frequently, this second filter remains unnoticed because
it is hardly ever challenged.152 In the rare cases when a creative litigant
tries to claim protection in such speech, courts summarily reject the
argument with little fanfare in various ways. In one case, such an argument
was simply dismissed as “absurd.”153 At other times, courts employ
various mechanisms that magically cause freedom of speech questions to
disappear, such as classifying a case as being about product liability for a
defective tool rather than regulation of speech.154 As a result, the case law
contains little elaborate reasoning or concrete guidance on how to detect or
apply the boundary that separates covered from uncovered speech.
The search engine speech debate fundamentally challenges this state of
affairs because it shatters the tacit consensual understanding supporting it.
The opinionated search engine argument explicitly denies the existence of
the coverage filter. It asserts that any communication within the definition
of speech not included in the traditional exclusionary categories receives
full protection. Moreover, the argument invokes strong language from
recent Supreme Court decisions purportedly supporting this position. This
raises the question of the existence of and the normative justification for the
coverage filter. Offhanded assertions based on a tacit consensus are no
longer possible.
The normative stakes of the question of coverage and of the broad speech
theory behind the opinionated search engine argument are much higher than
those of the immediate question of search ranking regulation. In the
absence of a coverage filter, when any speech, including implied
observations of relevance, receives full First Amendment protection, large
swaths of legal regulations may become subject to the demanding standard
of First Amendment review. Consider the following examples.
For a handsome sum of money, Peter provides to competitors of his
employer access to the employer’s valuable secret business information that
151. See Post, supra note 72, at 715; Schauer, supra note 20, at 1777–84.
152. See Schauer, supra note 20, at 1778 (observing that to discuss uncovered speech,
“we need to leave our casebooks and the Supreme Court’s docket behind” and consider “not
only the speech that the First Amendment noticeably ignores, but also the speech that it
ignores more quietly”).
153. King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005).
154. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294–95 (9th Cir. 1985)
(classifying an erroneous airplane navigational chart as a defective product for purposes of
defective product liability law); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676–77 (2d Cir.
1983) (same); see also Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035–36 (9th Cir.
1991) (distinguishing a mushroom encyclopedia, which is “pure thought and expression,”
from aircraft navigational charts, which are “highly technical tools”).
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Peter keeps on his laptop. Specifically, Peter writes a computer program
that responds to the competitors’ search queries submitted to the program
via the internet. When a search term corresponds to a name of one of the
employer’s customers, the software displays a wealth of secret information
on the customer and its business relationship with the employer. When
sued under trade secret law,155 Peter asserts that the First Amendment bars
the claim because whenever his software presents information to a user it
also produces speech in the form of implied observations of relevance (i.e.,
that the displayed information is relevant for the user in relation to the
search term).
Paul, a minimarket owner, challenges as unconstitutional under the First
Amendment a new state law that regulates the shelf placement of certain
children’s food products, deemed unhealthy.156
The law prohibits
placement of the products on shelves of highest consumer visibility, those
below a certain height and those located in close proximity to the registers.
Paul argues that the law violates his First Amendment rights because his
choices about shelf placement, based on the visibility of the product, reflect
implied observations of relevance to consumer preferences of those
products, observations that are potentially understandable by consumers.
Mary is sued for negligence after a computerized system she
manufactures malfunctioned. The system monitors the parameters of an
industrial chemical process and provides notices divided into conspicuous
“high priority warnings” and less conspicuous “standard notices,” where
each category is displayed on a different screen. Due to a bug, the software
displayed the correct information about a critically dangerous value of one
of the process’s parameters on the standard notices screen instead of the
155. The described facts give rise to a plausible infringement of trade secret claim against
Peter, who disclosed information constituting a trade secret that he had acquired either under
a duty of confidence or using improper means. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40(b)(1)–(2) (1995); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 537 (2005) (defining trade secret “misappropriation”).
156. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Extending the Fantasy in the Supermarket: Where
Unhealthy Food Promotions Meet Children and How the Government Can Intervene, 9 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 117, 168–75 (2012) (discussing regulation of food product placement on the
basis of its nutritional value). The scant case law on this issue is not very clear or consistent,
but it is not hospitable to First Amendment claims in regard to product location. In Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), the Supreme Court assumed, for purposes of its
analysis of a regulation that prohibited self-serving display of tobacco products, that
manufacturers have a “cognizable speech interest” in a particular means of displaying their
products. Id. at 569–70. The Court found, however, that “Massachusetts seeks to regulate
the placement of tobacco products for reasons unrelated to the communication of ideas” and
upheld the regulation under a content-neutral test applied to such cases. Id. Other cases
expressed a more skeptical view on the very applicability of the First Amendment to similar
situations. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 496
(1981) (rejecting a challenge to a regulation prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia in
proximity to literature about illegal drugs because “insofar as any commercial speech interest
is implicated . . . it is only the attenuated interest in displaying and marketing merchandise in
the manner that the retailer desires”); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. City of S.F., 345 F. App’x
276, 277 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that selling cigarettes in pharmacies is not a protected
expressive activity because it “doesn’t involve conduct with a ‘significant expressive
element.’” (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 701–02 (1986))).
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“high priority warnings” one. As a result, the employee in charge of the
process failed to notice the danger, stop the process in time, and prevent a
destructive explosion. Mary argues that the First Amendment bars a
negligence claim because her software’s decisions on which screen to
display the notice contain implied observations on the degree of priority of
the message, potentially understandable by users.
The point should be clear by now. Implied observations of relevance are
everywhere. Almost anything that is done by people and their creations in
the social and economic realms has a connotative meaning about relevance.
Much of this meaning is at least as expressive as search ranking “opinions”
of relevance. Such communication satisfies the broad definition of
expression and it does not necessarily fall within the categories of excluded
speech. The much-criticized distinction between speech and conduct is of
little help in preventing the extension of First Amendment protection to
substantial parts of this communication, found in every corner of social and
economic life. As many commentators observe, speech and conduct is
often a hopelessly slippery distinction on which to build the boundaries of
the First Amendment.157 The reason is twofold. First, every human
communication involves some conduct. Second, and more importantly,
many forms of human conduct involve some meaning, especially when we
include connotative meaning. The opinionated search engine argument and
the extension of its logic ad absurdum demonstrate the latter point. The
meaning-bearing action in any of the three examples above does not clearly
qualify as conduct any more than hyperlinked, ranked search results.158
The conduct-speech distinction hardly seems the silver bullet that will allow
us to treat search engine ranking as covered speech, but not the ubiquitous
meaning attached to many other human actions.
Nor is the tactic known as the O’Brien test, which courts sometimes use
in hard speech/conduct cases, of much use here.159 Under this test,
inaugurated in United States v. O’Brien,160 in cases where regulated
conduct closely bundles together speech and nonspeech elements, the court
subjects the regulation to a special constitutional standard designated for
these cases. This is an intermediary form of scrutiny—essentially the test
applied today to any content-neutral regulation—midway between the
exacting standard applied to content-based regulations and the lax rational-

157. See, e.g., 1 SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 2:52; see also C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 70–73 (1989); FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN
A FREE SOCIETY 16–40 (1981).
158. Perhaps one could distinguish arranging products on the shelf from ranking search
results on the ground that the former involves the physical action of placing the products.
One would still be hard pressed to explain why the distinction between physically arranging
products and structuring information provides a good normative reason to distinguish the
cases.
159. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see FARBER, supra note 75, at 40
(discussing how the O’Brien test explains the fading away of the importance of the speechconduct distinction by shifting the focus from this distinction to the question of content
neutrality).
160. 391 U.S. at 367.
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basis standard applied to nonspeech regulation.161 The trouble with the
O’Brien escape route in our context is that one of the basic elements of the
test requires that the regulation be content neutral, meaning that it must not
be based on the specific expressive content of the conduct.162 In the case of
search results, as well as in the myriad of analogous cases, this distinction is
impossible. Action and connotative meaning are too closely bundled.
Change the action and you necessarily change the meaning. Target a
specific conduct and you necessarily target a specific meaning embedded in
it.163 Prohibiting a specific search ranking or a specific arrangement of
products on the shelf necessarily targets specific connotative meaning about
relevance associated with these actions. Consequently, O’Brien is of no
help in stemming the flood of First Amendment scrutiny resulting from the
opinionated search engine argument.
At this point, some readers may wonder what is wrong with extending
the First Amendment to all meanings connoted by a vast universe of
pervasive human actions. This is the point where the dark shadow of First
Amendment Lochnerism comes into the picture. The Lochner era at the
dawn of the twentieth century, named after Lochner v. New York,164 is
remembered as a period of aggressive attack by the courts on the ability of
government to regulate economic and social life grounded in the
substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.165 Some
commentators, who identified a broad trend in recent decades of a turn by
big business to the First Amendment in order to frustrate various
governmental regulations, have dubbed this trend “First Amendment
Lochnerism.”166 This turn to the First Amendment, perhaps reminiscent of
the role played by the Fourteenth Amendment during the Lochner era, is
understandable. In post–New Deal constitutional jurisprudence, the First
Amendment is one of the most significant enclaves of the Court’s
willingness to aggressively scrutinize and considerably limit government

161. Under this test, the regulation will be upheld “if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id. at 377.
162. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (noting
that to pass constitutional muster the regulation must be “justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech”).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 244–47.
164. 108 U.S. 45 (1905).
165. See generally PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL
154–76 (1998) (discussing the Lochner era); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 379, 417–22 (2011) (discussing the criticism of Lochner in mainstream American legal
thought and revisionist efforts).
166. See generally Kenneth D. Katkin, Symposium Introduction, First Amendment
Lochnerism? Emerging Constitutional Limitations on Government Regulation of Nonspeech Economic Activity, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 365 (2006); Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court
v. America: How the Roberts Supreme Court Is Using the First Amendment To Craft a
Radical, Free-Market Jurisprudence, 23 DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS 46, 52 (2012), available at
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/23/the_roberts_court_v_america.pdf
(describing
recent Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence as “neo-Lochner-ism”).
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regulatory action.167 A more recent development is the rise of the
information economy in which much business activity is concentrated
around informational resources or streams—exactly the kind of subject
matter that could be potentially characterized as “speech.” Together, these
two features make the First Amendment a very rich vein to be mined by
business actors seeking refuge from regulation. Needless to say, positive
explanations do not necessarily make a normative justification.
The opinionated search engine argument takes this process to a new
level. It raises the specter of a true First Amendment Lochnerism: a
jurisprudence in which the First Amendment, like the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Lochner era, subjects almost any economic and social
regulation to exacting constitutional scrutiny and throws its validity into
doubt.168 Such a development would fundamentally change the balance of
post–New Deal jurisprudence based on the lax test of rational basis
accompanied by limited enclaves of higher-standard scrutiny, including the
limited area of application of the First Amendment.169
It is highly doubtful that the recent Supreme Court opinions containing
broad language on the limited nature of First Amendment exceptions
contemplated this sort of opening of the floodgates or considered its
monumental implications. A much more plausible reading of these
opinions is to understand their ruling as limited to the first filter, that of
exclusionary categories, and as saying nothing about the second one, that of
coverage. Under this reading, when the Supreme Court said in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n that “new categories of unprotected speech
may not be added to the list” of traditional categories of excluded speech, it
refused to add any content-based excluded categories or to read broadly the
existing ones.170 It simply did not address, however, the different issue of
coverage. It would be strange if the Court intended to eliminate the
longstanding, if somewhat obscure, coverage filter without a word of
reasoning on the subject and without a hint of considering the far-reaching
effect of such a move on the structure of constitutional review.
167. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 58, 67
(1998) (describing the split in the post–New Deal Supreme Court over the question of
increased protection to First Amendment freedoms and the ultimate triumph of the view
supporting this position).
168. See Pasquale, supra note 43, at 118 (arguing that a broad application of the First
Amendment to search engines’ speech “threatens to ‘Lochnerize’ the field”); Wu, supra note
24, at 1508 (“At some point a broad theory of speech would encounter the anticanonical
influence of Lochner v. New York.”).
169. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) (observing
that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis”—subject to “narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality” in certain cases); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980) (developing a theory that explains the structure of
modern constitutional law, as expressed in Carolene Products, on the basis of the Court’s
function of making sure that “the channels of political participation and communication are
kept open”).
170. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
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Concluding that the Supreme Court did not eliminate the coverage filter
from First Amendment jurisprudence still leaves open the hard questions
triggered by the opinionated search engine argument. What is the criterion
for deciding whether the First Amendment covers particular speech, and
how does it apply to search ranking’s implied observations of relevance?
C. Normative Framework: Freedom-of-SpeechSignificant Social Practices
One may scour the case law in vain for a clear test or even guidance on
the question of First Amendment coverage. In the absence of either
doctrinal guidance or a tacit consensus, answers must be sought in
normative analysis. Normative theories of freedom of speech are somewhat
of an embarrassment. Commentators point out that no normative theory
can coherently account for First Amendment jurisprudence in its entirety,171
and courts appear almost gleeful to ignore such theories.172 Despite this
disdain, however, the only coherent way of formulating guidance on
applying the coverage filter is through normative analysis.173
There are three dominant normative theories of freedom of speech.
Democratic governance theory focuses on the instrumental value of speech
in facilitating the deliberative process essential for democratic politics.174
The pursuit of truth theory emphasizes the importance of an open and free
marketplace of ideas in furthering the exploration of truth.175 Finally,
autonomy theory regards speech as a fundamental part of individual liberty
and as a central aspect of human self-realization.176 The trouble, as
Frederick Schauer explains, is that none of these three theories is able to
explain the entire pattern of exclusion and inclusion of First Amendment

171. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, at vii
(1966) (“[N]o really adequate or comprehensive theory of the First Amendment has been
enunciated, much less agreed upon.”); see Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2372 (2000) (arguing that the
Supreme Court has not consistently adopted any one theory of the First Amendment); Steven
Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L.
REV. 559, 560 (2011) (“No theory has dominated.”).
172. FARBER, supra note 75, at 6 (noting that single value theories of First Amendment
law “were almost entirely ignored by the courts”).
173. See Post, supra note 72, at 716.
174. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 119–78 (1995); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy As
the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011).
175. The metaphor of the marketplace of ideas is usually traced back to Justice Holmes’s
dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). On
the pursuit of truth theory, see SCHAUER, supra note 149, at 6, and William P. Marshall, In
Defense of the Search for Truth As a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1
(1995).
176. See generally BAKER, supra note 157, at 194–224; SCHAUER, supra note 149, at 68–
70; Thomas E. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
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coverage.177 Schauer’s response seems to be giving up altogether on
normative explanations of coverage and switching to a positive account
instead.178
Robert Post offers a way out of this apparent dead end. The normative
underpinnings of coverage rules, Post explains, cannot be understood by
reference to abstract and broad categories of speech detached from specific
social context.179 Flag burning, computer code, or sentences written on
paper, do not have a general and constant normative significance. Their
normative significance only arises within the rich details of the specific
social practices in which they are embedded.180 The same written sentence
carries a different normative weight when produced as part of a client’s sale
order to a broker and when displayed on a street protest sign. Computer
code may have little normative significance related to freedom of speech
when merely fed to a computer that executes its instructions compared to
when it is published in a computer science journal or blog. In short, speech
and its regulation can only be normatively evaluated in the context of the
specific social practices in which the speech is embedded. It follows that
the coverage filter should not be understood as applying to abstract
categories of speech. Exclusion from the coverage of the First Amendment
is based not on an abstract classification of the speech but on a normative
judgment that a specific speech practice targeted by a regulation at issue is
not relevant for First Amendment values.181 This approach provides a
normative criterion for coverage: a particular regulation targeting a specific
practice is outside the coverage of the First Amendment when the speech
practice, understood in light of the specifics of the social interactions
involved, has little or no significance for freedom of speech values.
Grounding First Amendment coverage in concrete social practices
explains why no single normative theory is successful in explaining its
pattern. Rather than embodying a single monolithic value, various speech
practices implicate different values.182 Some practices may embody mainly
the value of democratic governance; others the value of truth seeking; and
yet others a mix of several free speech values. Some social practices,
although involving speech in the technical sense, do not significantly
involve any relevant free speech value. It follows, then, that the First
Amendment covers a particular regulation when the specific social practice
it adversely affects is more than trivially relevant for any plausible free
speech value. Thus, for example, it seems that, prima facie, the prisoner’s
sale instructions to his broker fail the coverage test. While the prisoner’s
expression is technically speech (which may be covered in other social
177. Schauer, supra note 20, at 1785 (“[N]one of the existing normative accounts appears
to explain descriptively much of, let alone most of, the First Amendment’s existing
inclusions and exclusions.”).
178. Id. at 1788–1807.
179. Post, supra note 22, at 1273 (“The unit of First Amendment analysis . . . ought not to
be speech, but rather particular forms of social structure.”).
180. Id. at 1255.
181. Id.; see also Post, supra note 72, at 716.
182. Post, supra note 22, at 1271–72.
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contexts), the specific social practice involved seems of little relevance to
any of the dominant three normative theories of freedom of speech, or,
indeed, to any other alternative theory.
D. The Social Practice of Search Ranking
How does this normative framework apply to search ranking?
Observations on the relative relevance of websites for users’ specific
preferences are not speech excluded from First Amendment coverage in the
abstract. Rather, the specific speech practices of search engines affected by
the kind of regulations considered in this Article must be evaluated. An
analysis based on this proper focus yields a clear conclusion: the specific
speech practices of connotative observations of relevance embodied in
search results are hardly of normative relevance from the perspective of any
of the common normative theories of freedom of speech.
Consider first the search for truth theory. In the abstract, search rankings
contain propositions whose veracity could be affirmed or refuted.183
Google may be right or wrong in observing that I prioritize a group of
websites in a certain way in relation to a particular search term.184 The
reason why search rankings are of little normative significance is not the
content of the speech, but rather the nature of the speech practices involved.
The social practice through which the speech is carried out has nothing to
do with conventional social practices and procedures associated with the
investigation of truth as a valuable social enterprise. As Post puts it,
“Truth-seeking is not merely a matter of sentences and propositions; it also
involves habits of mind, priorities of reason, intersubjective orientations,
and attitudes that, when taken together, make up what we recognize to be
rational exchange or collective search for knowledge.”185 We can refer to
these conventional practices as “inquisitorial practices,” namely social
speech practices that have a reasonable, substantial connection to the
examination, validation, or refutation of the truth value of propositions.
Google publishing an article or a blog post in which it makes certain claims
about the preferences of certain groups of users or even disseminating a
compendium of raw information about the subject could plausibly be seen
as inquisitorial speech practices. But the inquisitorial aspect of propositions
implied in search rankings is too incidental and trivial to have any
significant normative value. In this respect, the scenario is analogous to the
prisoner instructing his broker to sell stock.186 The speech in this example
183. See Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 916 (arguing that search results are “descriptive
opinions about relevance”).
184. Arguably, search rankings embody another category of propositions with a truth
value: propositions about what the search engine thinks the user’s priorities are. Taking
these propositions as the focus of the search-for-truth argument, however, reduces it to a
triviality. Almost any social action involves a self-referential, implied proposition about the
beliefs and dispositions of the actor. Arguing that any such action should be protected by the
First Amendment because of its value for the search for truth seems to justify too much and
therefore nothing.
185. Post, supra note 22, at 1272.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 145–46.
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contains implied propositions having a truth value, such as observations
about the prisoner’s preferences and possibly even his views about the
expected performance of certain stock. An attempt by the prisoner to
publish an essay on the subject, and perhaps even a pamphlet with
recommendations to investors, would be an inquisitorial practice relevant
for the value of truth seeking, but the broker instruction is not. In this case,
as in the case of search ranking, the connection to conventional social
practices reasonably related to the search of truth is too remote and
precarious to be of normative significance.
A similar analysis applies to the application of democratic governance
theory. In the proper context arguments, views and even raw information
about preferences of users can be part of a deliberative democratic process.
But the specific social practice of search ranking is not directly part of
social practices relevant for democratic self-governance. Democratic
governance is not “merely a matter of talking,”187 but involves a specific set
of social interactions in which citizens engage each other through dialogical
speech. A dialogical practice is a specific form of interaction by which
humans govern themselves collectively through argumentation, persuasion,
deliberation, and debate.188 The speaker and user interaction in regard to
search ranking is not dialogical or deliberative. No one reads search results
to be informed of Google’s views of users’ preferences. More importantly,
users do not potentially interact with search ranking dialogically. One may
find different rankings more or less useful for her purposes. But one is not
persuaded or unconvinced by a search ranking. One does not consider the
arguments of search rankings, examine her opinions against them, or write a
critique of them. The heart of the matter is, again, the nature of the social
practice involved. A map could be speech that is normatively significant
for democratic values when embedded in a relevant social practice, such as
a pamphlet or a civic group’s emblem. The very same map carries no
normative significance when sold and used as a navigational aid.189 The
social practice of observations of relevance contained in search results is
much like the latter. It is not sufficiently connected to any deliberative or
dialogical speech practice that could be plausibly associated with the
democratic process, even broadly construed.
Individual autonomy is probably where the normative insignificance of
the social practice of search ranking is most obvious. Several threshold
issues cast serious doubt on the relevance of this normative outlook for
search ranking. Consider first the nature of the postulated speaker: a
business corporation engaged in a commercial activity. Whose individual
autonomy is promoted by the speech imputed to Google or Microsoft? The
connection between the speech embodied in search ranking and the
autonomy interest of any of the multitude of actual individuals represented
187. Post, supra note 22, at 1272.
188. Id. at 1254; see also Post, supra note 72, at 720.
189. See Post, supra note 22, at 1254 (explaining that navigation charts do not receive
First Amendment protection because we interpret them as “speaking monologically to their
audience”).
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by the corporate personality fiction is far from clear.190 It has long been
settled that the First Amendment protects business corporations,191 but to
make a specific normative argument for the extension of free speech
protection explicitly based on the supposed personal autonomy interest of a
business corporation still seems like a stretch.
Consider next the identity of the speaker in the case of search ranking, its
corporate status aside. Who exactly is the “author” of the implied
observations of relevance embodied in search ranking? Proponents of
search engine speech seem to tacitly rely on a mechanical agency theory.
Specific search rankings are produced by a computer program incorporating
a complex algorithm. The output of the algorithm may be imputed to its
human creators, whose own actions may be imputed, in turn, to their
corporate employer. In this construct, the algorithm is a tool, much like a
painter’s brush or a writer’s word processor. The speaker is the human
agent who designed and used the tool to produce a certain result.192 The
difficulty with search ranking, in the age of personal search, is that the
specific result or speech is produced through an interaction between the
carefully designed tool (the algorithm) and a rich set of personal user data
that is not produced or controlled by the designer of the tool.193 The
substantial part that data plays in shaping the final result undermines the
alleged unbroken connection between the designer of the tool and the
outcome it claims as an expression of its personal autonomy. Consider the
analogy of an intricate musical instrument whose tubes and valves are
carefully designed by its creator to respond to air temperature and
movement, thereby producing predetermined sounds. After being placed in
the open, the instrument reacts to changing random natural conditions and
produces a complex tune. Can the designer of the instrument be plausibly
seen as the author of the tune? More importantly, should the tune, as
opposed to the design of the instrument, be seen as an expression of the
designer’s autonomy? The answer to these questions is not self-evident.
Whatever the merit of those threshold doubts, the main reason why
search rankings carry no normative weight from the perspective of
individual autonomy is much the same as in the case of the other theories.
Even bracketing the corporate status of the speaker and its doubtful claim
for authorship, the specific speech practice involved is of little relevance to
the values of individual autonomy and self-realization. The expression
implicit in search results hardly seems an act of individual self-realization
190. See BAKER, supra note 157, at 201–02 (arguing that the speech of a business
enterprise in a commercial context cannot be attributed to the personal beliefs of its owners
or employees).
191. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
192. Benjamin, supra note 16, at 1465–67 (discussing various examples where speech
produced by automated algorithmic process is attributed to the person who designed the
process).
193. Goldman, supra note 99, at 198 (describing the shift toward personalized ranking
algorithms that produce different results on the basis of user-specific data); Grimmelmann,
supra note 12, at 877 (describing how search results are generated “based on hundreds of
signals”).
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or an assertion of the speaker’s identity. The expression is merely a side
effect, an incident of a functional apparatus whose main purpose is to
promote the search engine’s commercial interest by providing a useful
service for users.194 Again, the crux of the matter is not the abstract content
of the speech, but the specifics of the social practice in which it is
embedded.
Expression consisting of ranking content, even when it is of service to
users, could be germane for the speaker’s autonomy and identity. Consider,
for example, a ranked list of website recommendations on a particular topic,
created by a human author that includes elaborate evaluation and personal
impressions of each website. In this example, the speech strongly connects
to the speaker’s affirmation of self-identity and choice, as well as the
realization of her rational faculties through expression. There is a
continuum of speech practices leading from such contexts that strongly
implicate autonomy values to others where the connection between speech
and affirmation of individual freedom and personality is weaker. Search
ranking is located close to the extreme end of this continuum, where any
such connection is negligible at best.
To be sure, in some abstract sense, search rankings involve autonomy.
They embody someone’s choices (mediated through algorithm and data) on
what to include and how to rank websites in response to users’ queries. But
in this broad and loose sense, any volitional human activity involves
autonomy. What matters for free speech autonomy theory is not autonomy
in the abstract, but rather expressive autonomy. Autonomy as a normative
ground for freedom of speech identifies speech as a unique realm where
there is a particularly strong and close connection between individual
subjective choices or identities and their manifestation in the world.195 This
specific connection between expression, self-identity, and self-realization
justifies special protection from governmental intervention, beyond that
given on general autonomy grounds.196 Specific social practices where
speech does not hold this intimate connection to individual identity and
subjectivity carry no normative significance from the point of view of the
autonomy framework that justifies special protection to speech on account
of its unique connection to individual self-realization.
Recall that it is not the general content of the speech that makes it
normatively insignificant.197 Nor does the mere fact that it was produced
with the aid of a computer algorithm render the speech normatively
194. See Company Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014) (“Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make it
universally accessible and useful.”).
195. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 993 (1978)
(“[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment values of self-fulfillment and popular participation in change
emphasize the source of the speech in the self, and make the choice of the speech by the self
the crucial factor in justifying protection.”).
196. See SCHAUER, supra note 149, at 8 (“[A] Free Speech Principle [means that] a
limitation of speech requires a stronger justification, or establishes a higher threshold, for
limitations of speech than for limitations of other forms of conduct.”).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 179–81.

2014]

THE FOLKLORE OF INFORMATIONALISM

1671

insignificant. Rather, the free speech analysis is driven by the full specific
context of the social practice in which the relevant speech is embedded.
When analyzed from this perspective, implied observations of relevance
embodied in a search engine ranking have no normative significance from
the point of view of each of the three dominant normative theories of
freedom of speech. Someone is yet to suggest an alternative normative
ground explaining why the First Amendment should cover search rankings
as understood in the context of their relevant social practices.
E. Objections
There are several possible objections to the conclusion that the speech
embodied in search engine ranking is not covered by the First Amendment
because it involves no normatively significant speech practices. The first
objection is that the First Amendment applies to any regulation that targets
a specific viewpoint, irrespective of the presence of any protected speech.
The second objection is that typically users’ experience with search results
is interactive or even conversational, and that as a result the opinions
embodied in search ranking are part of a dialogical speech practice. The
third and last objection is that search ranking, even if not itself a
normatively significant speech practice, has instrumental effects on other
social practices that are highly relevant for freedom of speech values. Each
of these ostensibly weighty objections dissolves on closer examination.
1. Viewpoint Discrimination
A possible objection to the foregoing analysis is that it is unduly focused
on the character of search engine speech. The conclusion that a search
ranking is uncovered speech is based on the premise that the speech
practices of ranking do not realize free speech values. First Amendment
coverage is not limited, however, to cases involving speech recognized as
such under the broad doctrinal definition. In some cases, the First
Amendment may apply even when the relevant speech falls within one of
the traditional categories of excluded speech or, according to at least one
commentator, even when no speech at all is present.198 Thus, in R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul,199 the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance that
criminalized hate speech by punishing communicative behavior “which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.”200 The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
ordinance was restricted to “fighting words”—one of the traditional
categories of excluded speech.201 The Court reasoned that the regulation
198. See Post, supra note 22, at 1259 (arguing that evaluation of regulation aimed at
targeting a specific viewpoint “ought not to depend upon whether the actions of a particular
defendant are communicative in nature”).
199. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
200. Id. at 380, 391.
201. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
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targeted only hate speech embodying a particular viewpoint, thereby
violating the principle that “government may not regulate use based on
hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”202
Scholars have described this principle as a general ban on governmental
viewpoint discrimination or content-based censorial motivation.203 Under
this principle, the First Amendment is triggered whenever the government
attempts to suppress a specific viewpoint, whether or not the regulated act is
recognized as nonexcluded speech for purposes of the First Amendment.204
Applying this principle, one could argue that the regulation of search
ranking necessarily targets specific viewpoints (i.e., certain implied
observations of relevance) on the basis of their content, and therefore
triggers the First Amendment, irrespective of the presence of covered
speech.
This objection falls flat because coverage grounded in the regulation’s
targeting of a specific viewpoint is subject to the same analysis as coverage
based on the presence of speech. Just as the existence of speech is not a
sufficient condition for triggering the First Amendment, so too is the
existence of a governmental purpose of targeting specific content. The
same logic applies to both alternatives. Applying the First Amendment to
any regulation that could be described in the abstract as targeting specific
content would be inconsistent with either existing doctrine or any normative
justification of freedom of speech. Specific content or even viewpoint is
implicit in countless social activities. When trade secrets law prohibits the
disclosure of certain information (that which is secret and of value to its
owner), but not other information, it targets specific content.205 When
criminal law prohibits the sale of certain controlled substances, it targets
specific implied representations by sellers on relevance for buyers’
preferences on the basis of point of view. If it covered any regulation that
could be formally described as targeting specific viewpoints, the First
Amendment would be omnipresent. Fortunately, that is not the case. Just
like the mere existence of communicated meaning (i.e., speech), the formal
feature of a regulation as targeting specific content by itself is an
insufficient condition for triggering the First Amendment. The R.A.V.

202. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386.
203. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Post, supra note 22, at
1255; Wu, supra note 24, at 1514.
204. See Post, supra note 22, at 1255 (“First Amendment Jurisprudence is concerned not
merely with what is being regulated, but also with why the state seeks to impose
regulations.”); Wu, supra note 24, at 1514 (“Even if the communication in question would
not otherwise be considered speech, a demonstrated censorial motive on the part of the
government can trigger First Amendment analysis anyhow.”).
205. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 9 U.L.A. 538 (2005)
(defining protected “trade secret” as information that “(i) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy”).
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majority opinion expressed this principle by limiting its holding to cases
when a “realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”206
The need to differentiate between content-based regulations covered by
the First Amendment and those that are not leads back to the analysis
offered above.207 The only currently available satisfactory way of drawing
such a distinction is assessing whether a formally content-based regulation
of a specific social practice interferes with the realization of First
Amendment values. For the reasons already explained, search ranking is
not a social practice that directly realizes First Amendment values.208
Switching the ground from describing ranking as speech to presenting it as
an activity whose regulation targets a specific viewpoint does not change
the outcome of the analysis. The burden remains on search engine speech
proponents to show how the regulatory intervention with this social practice
is relevant for any normative account of free speech.
2. Search As a Dialogical Speech Practice
One may further object that the speech practices associated with search
ranking are, in fact, dialogical. Some searches are “navigational” in
nature.209 In those cases, the user is focused on a well-defined,
predetermined object for her search (say, locating the office number of a
colleague) and uses the search engine in a straightforward, mechanical way
to achieve this goal. These cases are the equivalent of looking for
someone’s phone number in a telephone directory. Other searches,
however, are much more open ended, and the interaction with the search
engine could be described as conversational. I may start my search with a
general key term, be presented by the search engine with prioritized results
or alternative search terms, and revise my search term in response to this
information. This process may be reiterated numerous times. Within the
course of this interactive process, the user may refine or change not just his
original search terms but also the goals of the search and perhaps even his
views or preferences. One may start the search process looking for
information on “global warming,” having just a vague, general idea of a
desire for more information on the subject, and end up looking for and
accessing the recruitment website of a specific activism group in this area.
Is not interaction of this sort a dialogical practice?
Furthermore, the effects of such conversational interactions with search
engines may be shaped in systematic ways.210 For example, alternative
206. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390. As an example of a formally content-based regulation that
does not raise such a concern, Justice Antonin Scalia cited the hypothetical case of a state
“prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses.” Id.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 179–81.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 182–95.
209. See generally Andrei Broder, A Taxonomy of Web Search, 36 ACM SIGIR F.
(2002), available at http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigir/forum/F2002/broder.pdf (classifying
searches into navigational, informational, and transactional).
210. Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 56, at 171 (expressing concern over the ways in
which the technological design of search engines determines “systematic inclusions and
exclusions”).
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designs of the search algorithm may steer different shares of users, who
started their search with the term “global warming,” toward very different
kinds of websites within this broad field. These systematic effects may be
“political” in the sense of channeling users toward exposure or nonexposure
to particular kinds of information with different impacts on views and
actions.211 Perhaps these systematic effects are even intentional, in the
sense that the algorithm’s designers are deliberately structuring it to channel
users into certain substantively preferred patterns. Search engines have
understandably avoided describing themselves as embedding their own
substantive preferences in their algorithm. When Google abandoned its
self-cultivated public image as a neutral tool for objectively representing
information, it carefully replaced it with the concept of search ranking as
subjective opinions on relevance for users’ preferences, not with the notion
of search ranking as a tool for instilling in users the search engine’s own
substantive preferences.212 Fears of search engines purposefully designing
the interactive search process to serve their own substantive preferences is
one of the main motivations of proponents of search engine regulation.213
Search engines, therefore, have no interest in portraying themselves in this
fashion in public debate. In the context of free speech, however, the idea of
the search process as promoting the search engine’s own substantive agenda
may play a different role. If much of the interaction of users with search
results is not only conversational but also informed by the search engine’s
own substantive views or preferences, isn’t this an obvious case of a
dialogical social practice? And, if search is a dialogical social practice, then
search ranking is part of a speech practice that embodies free speech values
and must be covered by the First Amendment.
This objection fails because, while search is often interactive, adaptive,
and perhaps even informed by the search engine’s substantive agenda, it is
not dialogical in the sense relevant for freedom of speech values. To
understand the difference, consider the following hypothetical analogy.
Imagine that Captain Jean-Luc Picard (from Star Trek) asks the replicator (a
machine capable of creating physical objects) for a “cake.”214 Fifteen
samples of cakes materialize with names and descriptions. After looking at
211. See id. at 181 (“[S]earch-engine design is not only a technical matter but also a
political one.”). For the classic argument about the political stakes in technological design,
see Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980).
212. See Metz, supra note 125 (discussing Google’s shift toward describing its search
ranking as opinions on relevance for users); see also Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc.,
No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *11 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003)
(adopting Google’s argument that its rankings are “opinions of the significance of particular
web sites as they correspond to a search query”).
213. Craig Timberg, Could Google Pick the Next President?, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2013,
at B4; see also Robert Epstein & Ronald E. Robertson, Democracy at Risk: Manipulating
Search Rankings Can Shift Voters’ Preferences Substantially Without Their Awareness
(May 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://aibrt.org/downloads/EPSTEIN_
and_Robertson_2013-Democracy_at_Risk-APS-summary-5-13.pdf.
214. Wikipedia helpfully explains that, in Star Trek, a “replicator” is “a machine capable
of creating (and recycling) objects.” See Replicator (Star Trek), WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replicator_%28Star_Trek%29 (last accessed Feb. 24, 2014).
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the cakes, Picard says, “Chocolate cake.” Ten different varieties of
chocolate cake appear. The process goes through several additional
iterations. By the end of the process, Picard ends up with a specific brand
of chocolate cake, having not just refined his choice but also adjusted his
views and preferences about cakes. The process described is interactive and
adaptive, but it is not dialogical. A dialogue, for purposes of democratic
free speech theory, means a group of conventional speech practices through
which people collectively govern themselves involving debate,
argumentation, persuasion, articulation and examination of views, or similar
activities.215 Shaping the views of others through an interactive process of
manipulation, not involving any of these conventional practices or others
similar to them, is not dialogical and is not given a privileged status by
democratic self-governance theory.
This conclusion will remain unchanged even if the interactive process is
designed with specific substantive goals or an agenda in mind. The fact
that the builder of the replicator purposefully designed the machine’s
responses to steer users toward particular brands of cakes, and away from
others, does not make the interaction with the replicator dialogical, as long
as the relevant speech practices are not part of it. Nor does it matter if the
means through which the interactive process unfolds constitute speech in
the technical sense. Assume that, instead of sample cakes, the replicator in
our example responds to each command by replicating a list of written
instructions directing the user to the physical location in the galley of
Picard’s starship, the Enterprise, where the cake samples are located. The
technical means through which the interactive process is carried out are
now speech, but the speech practices are still not dialogical because they
involve none of the conventional practices relevant for democratic theory.
The logic of the hypothetical example applies with equal force to search
practices. No doubt, the search process often uses speech in interactive and
adaptive ways. The process may even shape the preferences and views of
users. It is even possible that, in some cases, these shaping effects are
attributable to substantive preferences of the designer embedded in the
search algorithm’s design. All of this, however, does not transform search
into a dialogical practice. As long as the conventional deliberative practices
of collective self-governance through dialogue relevant for democratic
theory are absent, search remains a nondialogical social practice outside the
coverage of the First Amendment.
3. Instrumental Value
One final objection is that, although the observations of relevance in
ranking may not themselves be normatively significant practices, they
facilitate other practices that are. Search engine ranking—and potential
regulative constraints—greatly influence the ability of many speakers to
speak effectively and of many users to access speech and interact with it as
part of social practices that are at the heart of each of the three normative
215. Post, supra note 72, at 720.
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theories of freedom of speech. Undoubtedly, a regulation that makes it
significantly harder for a user to locate a suitable online forum for debating
the merits of healthcare reform or frustrates the ability of a website owner
to get effective exposure of her theory of global warming adversely affects
social practices that realize free speech values. The effect of search engine
regulation on websites’ and users’ speech practices, attributable to the
instrumental value of search engines for these practices, places such
regulation squarely within the purview of the First Amendment.
While valid, this argument has no effect on the conclusion that search
ranking as such is not within the coverage of the First Amendment. The
crucial point is that the relevant speech practices and the focus of the legal
analysis are not the observations embedded in search ranking, but rather the
speech interests of websites and users that may be instrumentally affected
by ranking practices. Search ranking regulations may be covered by the
First Amendment in the same way that the regulation of movie projectors,
paper, or TV sets may be. All of these practices are covered to the extent
they instrumentally affect other speech practices that are normatively
significant.216 Regulation of the technical design of TV sets may be
covered not because the design is speech or because the regulation is
content based in regard to the design, but rather because it may affect
normatively relevant speech practices facilitated by TV sets. The same
applies to search ranking. This logic leads back, of course, to First
Amendment review of search-ranking regulation driven by the interests of
search engine constituencies explained above.217
Whether search ranking is covered as such, or only because of its
instrumental value for other free-speech-significant practices, is of great
importance. Some regulations may clearly adversely affect search engine
constituencies’ speech practices. A law that prohibits search engines from
listing websites identified as including material about communism,
scientology, or sexuality adversely affects normatively significant speech
practices of users and website owners. Moreover, such a law regulates in a
way that is viewpoint based vis-à-vis these practices. Other regulations
may adversely affect such normatively significant speech practices despite
being content neutral in regard to them. The likely destructive effect that a
regulation that orders the randomization of search results would have on the
efficacy of a search probably places the regulation in this category.218 The
same may be true of a regulation that orders complete transparency of the
search algorithm because such transparency is likely to empower gaming of
the search process and lead to its corruption.219 But other regulations fare
much better when analyzed from the perspective of the speech practices of
the search engine’s constituencies. Consider a legal norm that prohibits a
216. See id. at 721–22 (discussing the application of the First Amendment due to
instrumental effects on media relevant for free speech values).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 54–79.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79.
219. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1201–02 (discussing search engines’
legitimate interest in secrecy).
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search engine from downgrading the ranking of a website because it does
not participate in a commercial program run by the search engine, such as
Google’s AdSense program.220 Seen as a regulation of Google’s speech
embodied in search ranking, this is a content-based regulation that has little
chance of surviving scrutiny. Analyzed from the perspective of search
engine constituencies’ speech practices, however, the regulation is content
neutral and is very likely to be found valid. It makes all the difference
whether a regulation is scrutinized as an abridgment of search ranking
speech or because of its instrumental effect on the speech of search engine
constituencies.
III. SPEECH AND FUNCTION
To recap the argument so far: The existence of speech is not a sufficient
condition for triggering First Amendment scrutiny. To be covered by the
First Amendment, the regulated specific speech practice has to be more than
trivially related to free speech values. And, the social practice of search
ranking does not satisfy this condition and therefore it is not covered.
The sort of freewheeling normative analysis on which this conclusion is
based may make some uneasy if offered as a model for courts’ handling of
novel claims for First Amendment protection of the kind presented by
search engine speech. Are judges to engage on an ad hoc basis in an openended policy evaluation of the normative significance of the speech
practices involved? To some extent, this is exactly what judges are already
implicitly doing whenever they assume that the First Amendment does not
cover a specific speech practice. Still, the kind of explicit normative
analysis necessitated by the dispute over search ranking and other machinegenerated speech may seem to some to be too unconstrained. As the
Supreme Court recently reiterated, First Amendment jurisprudence is
strongly averse to grant either government, or the courts, a plenary power to
deny First Amendment protection to speech on the basis of their evaluation
of its social value.221 Examining whether a specific speech practice has
sufficient connection to any free speech values is not the same as evaluating
the social value of speech on the basis of its content. Yet, some may see
unlimited discretion to engage in the former as treading too close to the
latter. But if the coverage filter is to exist at all, courts need some method
for deciding controversial cases such as the one presented by the search
engine speech argument.
A partial remedy for this dilemma is to adopt a strategy, typical of First
Amendment jurisprudence, known as the categorical approach.222 Rather
220. Google’s AdSense is an advertising model in which websites display targeted
advertisements administered by Google and share the revenue with it. See AdSense, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/adsense (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
221. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (describing as “startling and
dangerous” a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage based on balancing the value
of the speech against its social cost).
222. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 149; Wu, supra note 24, at 1509 (observing that
the categorical approach is “easier to criticize than improve upon”). For a critical account of
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than engaging in a completely ad hoc inquiry into the merits of every
speech practice relevant for each case, courts can apply general proxy
categories of uncovered speech practices. One such category, highly
relevant for search engine speech and for cases of machine-generated
speech more broadly, is that of functional speech practices.
A. The Latent Functionality Doctrine
Tim Wu has recently identified a de facto functionality doctrine in First
Amendment law.223 He also described this doctrine as “mysterious.”224
This is an understatement. In its current state, functionality is hardly a
doctrine at all. At most it is a latent, elusive principle whose status is akin
to the privacy principle at the time when it was “discovered” by Warren and
Brandeis as underlying various common law rules.225 Nevertheless, the
principle is there. Articulating and refining it as an explicit legal doctrine
could be the key for handling the hard coverage decisions that courts are
likely to face in the age of machine speech.
The gist of the proposed functionality principle is that the First
Amendment does not cover a particular speech practice if its predominant
purpose and nature focus on some functional end, and any nonfunctional
aspects of the speech practice in the relevant context are not more than
trivial. This category does not encompass all uncovered speech. It is a
stretch to call the defacement of property, and perhaps even an inside
trading tip, functional in this sense. But the category does capture a
significant amount of speech involving hard coverage questions, especially
in cases of machine-generated speech.
The functionality category applies to the specific speech practice rather
than to speech in the abstract. Computer code is a good example. One of
the foundational First Amendment decisions involving computer code is
Junger v. Daley.226 The case involved a facial challenge to a regulation
prohibiting the exportation of encryption computer code.227 The district
court rejected the argument that the regulation violated the First
Amendment by abridging speech embodied in computer code.228 It based
this conclusion on the premise that “source code is by design functional”
because “it is created . . . to do a specified task, not to communicate
ideas.”229 The Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling that code is protected by the
First Amendment because it “is an expressive means for the exchange of

the categorical approach, see 1 SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 12:9, and Pierre J. Schlag, An
Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1983).
223. Wu, supra note 24, at 1517 (“[C]ourts already maintain an informal exclusion based
on functional considerations.”).
224. Id. at 1533.
225. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
226. 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
227. Id. at 483–84.
228. Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d, 209 F.3d at 481.
229. Id. at 717.
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information and ideas about computer programming.”230 Finding that the
functional capacity of code should not preclude constitutional protection,
the court held that “the appropriate consideration of the medium’s
functional capacity is in the analysis of permitted government
regulation.”231
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Junger maps well on to the structure of a
functionality principle. Computer code in general is not an uncovered
category of speech. The specific social practices entangled with code vary
greatly. Some of these practices, such as installing or running software on a
computer, are clearly functional and do not directly realize First
Amendment values.232 Other code-related practices, such as publication in
an academic journal or the internet publication of code as part of course
materials at issue in Junger, clearly realize First Amendment values. As
explained by Robert Post, whether a particular regulation of code is covered
depends on the speech practices it affects.233 To the extent the regulation is
narrowly drafted to only capture functional code practices, it does not affect
covered speech.234 By contrast, if the regulation captures nonfunctional
speech practices, it affects covered speech and must be reviewed under the
appropriate First Amendment standard, depending on whether its effect on
such practices is content based or content neutral.
Finally, even if the regulation is limited to functional speech practices, its
incidental effect on other freedom of speech relevant social practices must
be considered. Thus, for example, if the regulation of encryption code
negatively affects the ability of people to use computer technology in order
to disseminate anonymous electronic speech (for example, through blogs or
discussion groups), it will be subjected to First Amendment review. The
focus of this form of review, however, will be the incidentally affected
speech practice, not the effect on the speech embodied in encryption
code.235
The closest the courts came to articulating a functionality category of
noncovered speech was another code-related case: Universal City Studios
Inc. v. Corley.236 The defendant in the case—Corley—was enjoined from
posting on his website and knowingly linking to decryption computer code
known as DeCSS, used to bypass CSS (Content Scrambling System), the
industry’s DVD access control measure.237 These actions were alleged to
230. Junger, 209 F.3d at 485.
231. Id. at 484.
232. See generally Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2320 (1994) (describing
software as “a machine whose medium of construction happens to be text”).
233. See Post, supra note 72, at 718–20.
234. In Junger, the government’s somewhat crude attempt to use this distinction failed
because the limiting criterion of the regulation did not restrict its effect to functional
practices. Limiting the regulation to encryption code published in electronic form still
included many nonfunctional practices such as an academic publication of code in an
electronic journal. See id. at 720.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77.
236. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
237. Id. at 437.
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violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) prohibition on
trafficking in technology for the circumvention of technological measures
controlling access to copyrighted works.238 Relying on Junger, Corley
argued that the DMCA violated the First Amendment by restricting the
dissemination of certain computer code.239 In analyzing this argument the
Second Circuit, upholding the trial court, recognized the complex nature of
computer code. Following Junger, the court ruled that “[c]ommunication
does not lose constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is
expressed in the language of computer code,”240 and that computer code
“can merit First Amendment protection.”241 Rather than concluding its
analysis at this point, however, the court went on to consider the significant
functional aspect of computer code and found that “[t]he functionality of
computer code properly affects the scope of its First Amendment
protection.”242 The court’s strategy for handling this duality of computer
code inherent in the combination of functional and expressive aspects is
typical of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. The court treated the
DMCA as a content-neutral regulation aimed at the functionality of
circumvention code and affecting its expressive content only
incidentally.243 Accordingly, the court analyzed the anticircumvention
prohibition under the lenient review standard applied to content-neutral
regulations, finding that enjoining Corley from posting and knowingly
linking to DeCSS passes muster.244
The Second Circuit’s decision in Universal City Studios correctly
articulated and applied the functionality principle. A finding that computer
code is merely expressive, or that it constitutes speech, is insufficient to
determine whether and how the First Amendment applies to a particular
regulation of code. The crucial element of the analysis is whether and how
the regulation targets significant speech practices, as opposed to just the
functional aspect of code. Unfortunately, the court’s insistence on fitting its
analysis of this question into the Procrustean bed of a content-neutral
review standard is untenable. The prerequisite for applying the contentneutral, intermediate review standard is finding that the regulation does not
target specific speech on the basis of its content. The court was able to find
that the DMCA was content neutral by artificially unbundling the
expressive and functional aspects of computer code and concluding that the
anticircumvention prohibition only targeted the latter. The opinion conveys
this argument through the metaphor of a skeleton key that happens to have
some text emblazoned upon it.245 The anticircumvention regulation, the
court explained, is content neutral “just as would be a restriction on
trafficking in skeleton keys identified because of their capacity to unlock
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2012).
Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 436.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 453–58.
Id. at 452–54.
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jail cells, even though some of the keys happened to bear a slogan or other
legend that qualified as a speech component.”246 The metaphor is
misleading. In the case of computer code, unlike the case of the textbearing key, the speech and the function are inexorably bundled together.247
In order to carry out a function in a specific way, computer code must have
specific expressive content. The specific expressive content of code—the
meaning understandable by humans who can read it—follows directly from
the specific function it carries out.248 In short, with code the expressive
content is the function and vice versa. It follows that a regulation of code
cannot target a specific function without directly targeting specific
expression because of its content. Unlike the regulation of skeleton keys,
which affects the text on the keys only incidentally, targeting the function
of computer code is targeting specific content of code.249
Disentangling the effects of regulation of code on function and content
cannot be done on the level of speech, as the Universal City Studios court’s
content-neutrality analysis attempts. But it can be done on the level of
social speech practices. A regulation cannot target a specific function of
code without directly targeting a specific expressive content, but it can
target a normatively irrelevant functional speech practice without targeting
normatively relevant speech practices. A prohibition on causing a computer
to execute circumventing computer code, for example, targets specific
speech on the basis of its content, but it does not target a social practice that
directly realizes First Amendment values. In such a case, the regulation
affects only uncovered speech and does not trigger First Amendment
review at all. When the analysis is done on the appropriate level—that of

246. Id. at 454.
247. One can demonstrate how speech and function are inexorably bundled together
through a somewhat clumsy metaphor that is more accurate than the court’s skeleton key. A
decryption code is analogous to a key whose function depends on a particular shape, where
the shape itself is expressive. Imagine, for example, a key that to achieve its unlocking
function must have a combination of numerous ridges in the form of English letters divided
into meaning-bearing words and sentences. With this metaphoric key, as in the case of code,
a particular function inevitably involves a particular expressive content. Regulating a certain
function inescapably means regulating a specific expressive content.
248. Samuelson et al., supra note 232, at 2316 (describing computer programs as
“machines (entities that bring about useful results, i.e., behavior) that have been constructed
in the medium of text (source and object code)”).
249. A regulation may be considered content neutral even if its incidental effect
disproportionally affects particular speech. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 736 (2000)
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he permissibility of a time, place, or manner restriction, does
not depend on showing that the particular behavior or mode of delivery has no association
with a particular subject or opinion.”); McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“The critical question in determining content neutrality is not whether certain speakers are
disproportionately burdened, but, rather, whether the reason for the differential treatment
is—or is not—content-based.”). Thus, a regulation of noise levels may be considered
content neutral even if it disproportionally adversely affects the performance of a particular
genre of speech, for example rock music. The regulation of computer code does not fall
within this category of content-neutral regulations. The regulation of code does not
disproportionally affect particular content in a way that is incidental to targeting a particular
function. As explained, when it comes to code, the function and the expressive content are
one and the same, and targeting the function is targeting specific content.
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speech practices—its focus changes. The doctrinal inquiry becomes
coverage rather than the appropriate review standard.
Stripped of its indefensible flee to the content-neutral intermediate
review standard, Universal City Studios provides a template for a First
Amendment functionality doctrine. Faced with a First Amendment
challenge to a regulation affecting speech that closely combines functional
and expressive elements, a court should go through several stages of
analysis.
First, the court should examine the specific social speech practices
affected by the regulation. Any dominantly functional practice that only
trivially realizes free speech values is not covered, and the effect of the
regulation on it does not require First Amendment scrutiny. A good
example of uncovered suppression of speech in the context of the DMCA
anticircumvention provisions is the prohibition on circumventing a
technological measure controlling access to a copyrighted work (contrasted
with the prohibition on trafficking in such technology).250 The speech
practices targeted by this prohibition are purely functional. They are geared
toward achieving the utilitarian end of defeating a protection measure and
achieving access and they do not directly implicate free speech values.251
Alternatively, if an affected speech practice is found to directly realize
free speech values, the First Amendment must be applied. In cases such as
those of computer code, where the functional and expressive aspects of the
speech are closely entangled such that regulation of the function necessarily
entails the regulation of content, the strict standard applied to content-based
regulation must be used. The case of Professor Edward Felten falls within
this category.
Felten, a computer science researcher at Princeton
University, intended to present an academic paper demonstrating how his
team broke the digital music watermarking scheme developed by the
industry consortium known as Secured Digital Music Initiative (SDMI). He
was soon faced with legal threats from the Recording Association of
America accusing him of alleged trafficking in circumventing technology in
violation of the DMCA.252 Felten’s First Amendment claim in the ensuing
litigation, which was never decided on the merits, supplies a good example
of covered regulation of functional speech.253 The social practice at issue—
250. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012).
251. The speech potentially involved with circumventing a protection measure is not
necessarily computer code. Consider, for example, an access protection scheme that requires
users seeking access to a database to send to the system administrator a password consisting
of a poem verse. A person who defeats the scheme by using software that uncovers the
correct password and communicates the verse produces speech in the sense of a meaningful
expression that others may potentially understand, but the speech practice is purely
functional in nature.
252. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 416 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW
BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY 155–57 (2004); Pamela Samuelson, Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to
Science, 293 SCIENCE 2028 (2001).
253. See Complaint at 15–16, Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., No. CV- 012669 (D.N.J. June 26, 2001). The case was dismissed after the Recording Industry
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the presentation of an academic paper in an academic forum—is within the
heart of speech practices traditionally recognized as realizing free speech
values. Thus, despite the functional aspect of the speech (i.e., the fact that it
embodied a method for defeating the music protection scheme) a
functionality doctrine would not regard regulation of this speech as
uncovered by the First Amendment. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact
that the DMCA’s antitrafficking prohibition targets the functional aspect of
the speech—its aim is to prevent the proliferation of circumvention
capabilities—the applicable standard in this case is the strict standard
applied to content-based regulation. To prevent the proliferation of
circumvention technology, the regulation must regulate academic
presentations like that of Felten on the basis of their specific content.254
Finally, even if a particular speech practice is determined to be
functional, thereby freeing its regulation from First Amendment scrutiny,
any instrumental effect of the regulation on other normatively relevant
speech practices must be considered. This is the case of the possible
detrimental effect of restricting the dissemination of encryption code on
anonymous speech.255 The equivalent argument in the DMCA context is
that the statute’s strict regulation of access circumvention and of trafficking
in circumventing technology may result in an overbroad restriction of
speech, depriving many users of effective means of creating expression in
the digital age even when no legitimate interest such as preventing
copyright infringement is being served.256 According to this argument,
overly aggressive restriction of circumventing technology may result in
depriving many of access to valuable expressive materials in the public
domain or under circumstances of fair use.257 Notwithstanding that courts
gave this argument short shrift, any probable instrumental effect of this kind

Association of America publicly announced it would not bring suit against Felten. Press
Release, Elec. Frontier Found., Security Researches Drop Scientific Censorship Case (Feb.
6, 2002), available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20020206_eff_
felten_pr.html.
254. Between the two polar cases discussed in the text in regard to the DMCA
anticircumvention provisions lie harder cases in which the line between functional speech
practices and those that realize First Amendment values is harder to draw. The order in
Universal City Studios that enjoined posting of circumventing code on a website and linking
to websites offering such code is a case in point. Plausible arguments exist for regarding
either posting or linking as primarily functional in nature or, alternatively, for seeing them as
implicating nonfunctional practices realizing free speech values. The existence of hard
borderline cases, however, rather than being a fatal flaw, is a trait of any criterion or
category.
255. See supra text accompanying note 234.
256. See Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 416 (1999) (observing that if the
acts of circumvention by users “were privileged as a matter of free speech, it would be
difficult to sustain a prohibition on manufacture and sale of the products necessary to enable
users to engage in circumvention” and likening such a prohibition to a law that prohibits the
manufacture or sale of printers or modems).
257. See id. at 421 (“[The anticircumvention provision] prohibits circumvention per se,
with the legal consequence of giving the copyright owner a power to extinguish the user’s
privileged uses.”).
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must be analyzed under the proper First Amendment standard.258 But the
focus of this stage of the analysis will be the effect of the regulation on the
normatively significant speech practices that are instrumentally supported
by circumventing technology, not the effect on circumventing technology
as speech.
B. Search Ranking As Functional Speech
How does the functionality framework apply to implied observations of
relevance embodied in search ranking? As previously explained, the speech
practices of search engines are not connected in a meaningful way to the
realization of First Amendment values.259 The functionality analysis leads
to the flipside of this conclusion: the speech practices of search ranking are
not connected to free speech values because they are predominantly
functional.
Search ranking is functional speech because its overwhelmingly
dominant purpose and character is serving an instrumental function:
assisting users in locating and accessing content relevant to their specific
preferences. Uses of general-purpose internet search engines vary. As
mentioned above, some uses are navigational, in the sense that the user
already knows what information or at least what venue she is trying to
access and only uses the search engine as a directional tool (e.g., Jill
searches “Macy’s sale” in an attempt to reach the Macy’s sale website).260
Other searches are much more open ended and therefore include a stronger
element of the search engine shaping users’ preference (e.g., Jack searches
“affirmative action” hoping to educate himself on the subject). Different
search instances are located on different points of this spectrum. Even in
instances located closer to the open-ended pole of the search spectrum,
however, search engines’ ranking operates as functional speech. The
communication search engines generate is merely an instrumentality in the
process of helping users locate and access certain information.
Search engines undoubtedly differ from completely passive conduits for
transmitting information, such as cable services providers. Rather than
passively facilitating access by users to content on the basis of
predetermined user preferences, search engines often take a more
significant and active part in influencing and structuring the preferences of
users.261 James Grimmelmann captured this role of search engines by

258. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
that “the DMCA does not impose even an arguable limitation on the opportunity to make a
variety of traditional fair uses” and holding that “the fact that the resulting copy will not be
as perfect or as manipulable as a digital copy . . . provides no basis for a claim of
unconstitutional limitation of fair use”).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 183–95.
260. See generally Broder, supra note 209.
261. The distinction is one of degree. Even entities much closer to being passive conduits
relative to search engines often play some role in structuring users’ preferences. A cable
provider, for example, plays a weak role in shaping users’ preferences by selecting the
channels available on its system.
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describing them as “advisors.”262 The metaphor aptly captures the active
role of search engines in forming users’ preferences. But it may also be
misleading. The term evokes the image of one who helps another shape her
preferences through discursive practices: reasoning, dialogue, debate, or
exchange of opinions. But it is the absence of this discursive element from
the search process that makes it functional. This predominant functional
operation of search ranking is exactly what any plausible regulation targets,
whatever its underlying policy rationale. The aim of any legislative
measure or applicable common law doctrine is the instrumental effect of
rankings: the way they channel users to specific content by specific
providers.
One may object that the fact that a particular speech results in certain
effects, and that such postulated effects motivate its regulation, does not
make the regulated speech practice functional. Many regulations of speech
covered by the First Amendment are motivated by and target supposed
harmful or undesirable effects of speech. Advocates of regulating violent
computer games, for example, often point to the claimed causal connection
of exposure to such speech to violent behavior.263 The crucial difference is
that in the case of functional speech practices, the connection between the
speech and the targeted effect is not mediated through normatively
significant speech practices. In such cases, the speech operates merely as
an instrumentality, a means for bringing about the relevant effect without
implicating practices that realize free speech values. This is the difference
between excluding certain businesses from being listed in a Yellow Pages
directory and publishing bad reviews of the services provided by those
businesses. Both instances may result in reducing the patronage of the
businesses and both may shape customer preferences. But it is only the
latter that achieves the effect and shapes preferences through discursive
practices that realize free speech values. The speech embodied in search
engine ranking is of the former kind. It instrumentally facilitates a
functional process of channeling users to websites, and thereby helps to
shape users’ preferences, but does not do so as part of a social practice
relevant for free speech values. As a result, search engine ranking falls
within the category of functional speech not covered by the First
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Initially, the claim that First Amendment protection extends to ranking of
search results may appear well founded, at least as a matter of positive law.
On closer examination, this certainty disappears. The First Amendment has
a vital role to play in limiting governmental power to use search engines as
tools for suppressing the speech interests of information providers and

262. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 874.
263. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2748–51 (2011) (Alito,
J., concurring) (discussing arguments about the possible effects of violence in video games
in light of the interactive nature of this media).
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users. Applied in this way, however, even vigilant protection of free speech
rights allows much leeway for regulations of search engines that do not
have clear censorial effects or motivations in regard to users or information
providers. The more ambitious arguments that claim constitutional
protection for the speech interest of the search engine itself produce
somewhat inconclusive results under existing doctrine. As a normative
matter these arguments fare much worse. The relevant social practices of
search engine speech lack any meaningful connection to any values
underlying freedom of speech. As a result, there is no justification for
extending the strong protection of the First Amendment to these practices,
speech in the technical sense though they may be.
An important side effect of closely examining the arguments for search
engine speech is bringing to the fore the long-recognized but oft-repressed
question of First Amendment coverage. The claim that any regulation of
search results triggers the First Amendment simply because search rankings
qualify under a broad, technical definition of speech raises with full force
the question of coverage limitations. The implications of rejecting any such
limitations on the scope of the First Amendment could be momentous in
terms of the constitutional restrictions laid on government’s ability to
regulate in the information age. This is not simply a matter of criticizing
existing law. Coverage is part and parcel of existing First Amendment
jurisprudence, and yet it is an area of this law that is particularly obscure
and unarticulated. The development of a more explicit and elaborate
functionality doctrine could clarify this aspect of the law, at least in regard
to an important subset of the cases where activities that qualify as speech do
not receive First Amendment protection.
Perhaps most importantly, the search engine speech debate is a poignant
reminder that the field of First Amendment law could use a healthy dose of
some of the familiar lessons of legal realism. One such lesson is the
internal complexity of legal doctrine. The mechanical application of
abstract concepts, such as a general definition of speech, rarely decides
concrete legal questions, especially ones involving new and challenging
This
circumstances like the question of search engine speech.264
complexity is a feature of existing legal doctrine that already contains
nuances that prevent unproblematic derivation of clear outcomes in
concrete cases from abstract general principles.265 Understood against this
backdrop, conceptual abstractions that may seem determinative of the issue,
such as the editorial search engine or the opinionated search engine, lose
much of their appeal. Whether the First Amendment protects search
engines’ absolute control of their search ranking is a new and challenging
264. On the realist critique of deductive and analogical reasoning, see EDWARD PURCELL,
THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE
89 (1973), and WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM,
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 55–63 (1968).
265. See William W. Fisher, III, The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and
the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW—1791 AND 1991, at 270–71 (Michael J. Lacey
& Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
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normative question. It is a normative question, moreover, that cannot be
answered solely by reference to such abstractions as what constitutes speech
or who is an editor. An adequate answer can only be provided in light of
the concrete details of the social practices to which the legal rule is
applied.266 This Article argues that such an examination of the normative
significance of the social practices of search engine speech yields no reason
to extend First Amendment protection to search rankings.

266. Id. at 274–75.

